The Relationship of Countervailing Duty and Antidumping Law to Section 337 Jurisdiction of the U.S. International Trade Commission by Kaye, Harvey & Plaia, Paul, Jr.
Maryland Journal of International Law
Volume 2 | Issue 1 Article 3
The Relationship of Countervailing Duty and
Antidumping Law to Section 337 Jurisdiction of
the U.S. International Trade Commission
Harvey Kaye
Paul Plaia Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mjil
Part of the International Trade Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Maryland Journal of
International Law by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact
smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.
Recommended Citation
Harvey Kaye, & Paul Plaia Jr., The Relationship of Countervailing Duty and Antidumping Law to Section 337 Jurisdiction of the U.S.
International Trade Commission, 2 Md. J. Int'l L. 1 (1977).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mjil/vol2/iss1/3
THE RELATIONSHIP OF COUNTERVAILING DUTY
AND ANTIDUMPING LAW
TO SECTION 337 JURISDICTION OF THE U.S.
INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION
By HARVEY KAYE* AND PAUL PLAIA, JR.**
CONTENTS
PAGE
I. INTRODUCTION ------------------------------------------------------------------ 3
II. THE JURISDICTION PROBLEM ---------------------------------------- 4
III. HISTORY OF NON-PATENT SECTION 337 JURISDICTION 9
IV. HISTORY OF UNITED STATES COUNTERVAILING DUTY
LAW -----------------------------..............----------------------------------------- 27
A. Present Countervailing Duty Proceedings In The
U .S - .----------------------...................------------------------------------ 27
B. Countervailing Duty Legislation ------ .......--------------- 29
C. Bounties and Grants --------------------------.-------------- 32
V. HISTORY OF UNITED STATES ANTIDUMPING LAw -------- 36
A. Present Antidumping Act, 1921, Proceedings in
the U.S ..-------.----....................--------- ------------------------ 37
B. Antidumping Legislation --------------------------------------- 41
1. 1916 Antidumping Act ---------- .......--------------------- 42
2. 1921 Antidumping Act ---------------------------------------- 43
3. GATT ..-----.-------------.................----------------------------- 44
4. 1954 Customs Simplification Act -------------- - - 45
5. International Dumping Code -----------...-------- 45
6. 1968 Amendments ......................----------------------- 47
7. The Trade Act of 1974 -----------------------------------  48
C. Dumping ------- _-----....................-------------------------------- 49
* Member of the District of Columbia and Virginia bars; partner, Spencer &
Kaye, Washington, D.C.
** Member of the District of Columbia and Maryland bars; Kensington,
Maryland.
© 1977 HARVEY KAYE AND PAUL PLAIA, JR.
2 THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW JOURNAL
PAGE
VI. PREDATORY PRICING -------------------------------------------------------- 52
VII. ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONSHIP OF COUNTERVAILING
DUTIES AND ANTIDUMPING LAW TO COMMISSION'S
SECTION 337 JUUISDICTION -------- ..........-------------------------- 62
A. General ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 62
B. The Commission Alternatives ------------------------------ 64
1. The Commission Could Refuse To Exercise
Jurisdiction ------------------------------------------------- - -- - -  64
2. The Commission Could Refuse To Take
Jurisdiction Until After Treasury Has Acted 66
3. The Commission Can Take Jurisdiction
Immediately ----------------------------------------------- -- - --- 72
THE RELATIONSHIP OF COUNTERVAILING DUTY AND
ANTIDUMPING LAW TO SECTION 337 JURISDICTION
OF THE U. S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, particularly since the passage of the Trade
Act of 1974,1 there has been an increase in antitrust-type causes
being brought before the United States International Trade Com-
mission (formerly the United States Tariff Commission). These
actions are taken under section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as
amended,2 when imported articles are involved.
Section 337 relates to unfair trade practices in the importa-
tion of articles or in their sale.3 The statute can be separated
into the following elements which are necessary to a violation: 4
1. Unfair methods of competition or unfair acts;
2. in the importation or sale of articles;
3. by the owner, importer, consignee, or agent of either;
1. Public Law 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978, signed into law by the President on
January 3, 1975.
2. 19 U.S.C. § 1337. For the full text of section 337 see the Appendix.
3. For further information concerning an analysis of the amendments to section
337 made by the Trade Act of 1974, see Kaye & Plaia, Revitalization of Unfair Trade
Causes In The Importation of Goods: An Analysis of the Amendments to Section 337,
57 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 208, 269 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Kaye & Plaia, 1975].
For further information on developments concerning Section 337 proceedings since the
passage of the Trade Act of 1974, see Kaye & Plaia, Tariff Act Section 337 Revisited:
A Review of Developments Since The Amendments of 1975, 59 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 3
(1977). For a discussion of judicial review under the amendments, see Kaye, Unfair
Competition Appeals Under the New Trade Act, 69 F.R.D. 142 (1975), and for a
more general review of section 337, see Kaye, Unfair Trade in the Form of Patent
Infringement by the Importation of Products into the United States, CUMRENT
DEVELOPMENTS IN PATENT LAW 395, Practicing Law Institute, 1976. For background
on section 337 prior to the 1975 amendments, see Kaye & Plaia, The Tariff Comnis"
sion and Patents: Anatomy of a 337 Action, 55 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 346-62, 413-35
(1973).
4. These are found in 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a), which defines the violation.
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4. the effect or tendency of which is to destroy or substan-
tially injure an efficiently and economically operated U.S.
industry; or
5. the effect or tendency of which is to prevent the establish-
ment of such an industry; or
6. the effect or tendency of which is to restrain or monopolize
trade and commerce in the U.S.; and
7. when found by the Commission to exist, shall be dealt
with in addition to any other provisions of law as pro-
vided in this section.
When a violation is found by the Commission, it may issue
the following remedies:
1. A permanent exclusion order which prohibits entry into
the U.S. of the subject articles.5
2. A temporary exclusion order which may be issued during
the pendency of an investigation when the Commission
has reason to believe that there is a violation of the
statute.6
3. A cease and desist order may be issued in lieu of a tempo-
rary or permanent exclusion order.'
From an antitrust standpoint, it is important to note that
the Commission considers violations of the Federal antitrust laws
to be unfair methods of competition and unfair acts under the
statute.
This article traces the history of antitrust-type complaints
before the Commission. Current jurisdictional problems are
analyzed in light of the alternatives presented and the effective-
ness of these alternatives. In so doing, the relationship between
section 337, the Antidumping Act and countervailing duty laws
is examined.
II. THE JURISDICTION PROBLEM
The Commission's exercise of jurisdiction in areas related
to countervailing duties and antidumping matters is a recent
5. Pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d).
6. Pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1337(e).
7. Pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1337(f).
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development in the history of its jurisdiction under section 337.1
The Commission has discussed the problem regarding alleged
countervailing duty and antidumping act violations in the cur-
rent Color TV case.9
The complaint as originally filed alleged that:
Respondents have been engaged in unfair and anticom-
petitive acts and practices and by said acts and practices
have caused substantial injury to the Color Television in-
dustry, restraining the trade and commerce of that industry
in the U.S. By said unfair acts and practices, respondents
are participating and furthering an attempt by Japanese
importers to destroy the domestic U.S. portable television
set manufacturing industry.1"
It also alleged that respondents:
... have attempted to obstruct and obstructed the free
market prices of color sets in the U.S. by the development
and implementation of predatory pricing schemes whereby
Named Respondents import and sell color sets in the U.S.
at prices below-cost or at unreasonably low prices which do
not cover overhead costs."1
and further that:
Respondents have received and continue to receive
certain incentives and other economic benefits from the
Japanese government which facilitate Named Respondents
below-cost pricing in the U.S. and which aid and further the
attempt to destroy the U.S. portable color set manufacturing
industry. Importantly, such incentives and other economic
benefits do not fall in the technical definitions of "bounties
and grants" as set forth in Section 303 of the Tariff Act of
1930 as amended.12
8. See section III, History of Non-Patent Section 337 Jurisdiction, infra, notes
21-94 and accompanying text.
9. Certain ,Color Television Receiving Sets, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n [herein-
after, USITC], Inv. No. 337-TA-23 [hereinafter, Color TV Sets], Memorandum
Opinion issues December 20, 1976 [hereinafter, Memorandum Opinion].
10. Color TV Sets, supra note 9, Complaint filed January 15, 1976 at 19.
11. Id. at 20.
12. Id. at 25. But note that subsequent to the filing of the complaint the Customs
Court in Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, note 103, infra, reversed a Treasury
determination upon which complainant apparently based this statement.
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The complaint refers to a Treasury Notice 3 of a final deter-
mination that no bounty or grant was being paid or bestowed
within the meaning of section 303 upon the manufacture, produc-
tion or exportation of certain consumer electronic products from
Japan. The complaint nevertheless alleges that as an incentive
to export, the Japanese commodity tax on television receivers
manufactured in Japan is forgiven by the Japanese government
if the set is exported. The complaint argues that this amounts
to economic benefits through Japanese law. The notice states
that the final negative countervailing duty determination was
made by Treasury because the governmental benefits "involve an
aggregate amount considered to be de minimis per dollar of value
of the exported products." Based upon this finding, Treasury de-
termined that no bounty was being paid or bestowed directly
or indirectly within the meaning of section 303.
The Commission, in instituting a section 337 investigation,
defined the scope as including an inquiry into the allegations that:
(1) the existence of predatory pricing schemes resulting in
below-cost and unreasonably low-cost pricing of such
television sets in the U.S.; and
(2) economic benefits and incentives from the Government
of Japan contributing to the below-cost and unreason-
ably low-cost pricing in the U.S.
14
Subsequently, the complaint was amended to allege that:
... Respondents have engaged in unfair and anticompetitive
acts and practices individually, as well as in furtherance of
an unlawful contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint
of the United States trade or commerce in the color televi-
sion industry and have engaged in a combination or con-
spiracy to monopolize or attempt to monopolize such trade
or commerce or parts thereof, thereby causing substantial in-
jury to said industry. By said unfair acts and practices, and
by said unlawful contracts, combinations of conspiracies,
Respondents are participating in and furthering an attempt
13. 41 Fed. Reg. 1298, January 7, 1976.
14. Color TV Sets, supra note 9, Notice of Investigation, 41 Fed. Reg. 14014,
April 1, 1976.
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by Japanese importers to destroy the domestic U.S. portable
television set manufacturing industry .... 15
This appears to be the first time that an allegation of a contract,
combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade, or combination
or conspiracy to monopolize or attempt to monopolize trade had
been made in the case. The amended complaint also alleged that
the economic benefits from the Japanese government facilitated
the below-cost pricing in the United States.
In furtherance of the conspiracy, Respondents are alleged
to:
(1) have attempted to obstruct and have obstructed the
free-market prices of color television receivers in the
United States through predatory pricing schemes result-
ing in below-cost and unreasonably low-cost pricing of
such television receivers in the United States, and
(2) have received and continue to receive economic benefits
and incentives from the Government of Japan con-
tributing to the below-cost and unreasonably low-cost
pricing of such television receivers in the U.S. 6
Respondents allege, and the Commission does not seem to
disagree, that an adjudication of these allegations may involve
consideration as to whether the purchase price or exporter's sales
price of articles is less than the foreign market value, and whether
receipt of economic benefits and incentives from the Government
of Japan in furtherance of an unlawful attempt or conspiracy to
restrain or monopolize trade and commerce in the United States
involves a determination of whether such benefits or incentives
are unlawful per se. A problem arises when an allegation of preda-
tory pricing is made before the Commission under section 337.
An examination of an alleged predatory pricing situation necessi-
tates a detailed examination of the reasonableness of the prices
being charged. With the Commission following the established
body of antitrust law (when considering antitrust-type allega-
tions), its determination may require a decision as to whether
prices being charged in the United States are lower than those
15. Color TV Sets, .supra note 9, consolidated amended complaint filed May
25, 1976, at 19.
16. Color TV Sets, supra note 9, Memorandum Opinion at 4.
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being charged in other countries. As pointed out below, 17 the
same issue may arise in the application of United States anti-
dumping laws. Under the Antidumping Act, 1921, when a price
variance has been found by the Secretary of the Treasury, there
is a violation if the Commission finds that the existence of the
price differential is causing injury to the domestic industry.
The problem can be seen when one examines the language
of section 337 together with the legislative history. Section 337
(b) (3) provides:
Whenever in the course of an investigation under this
section, the Commission has reason to believe, based on in-
formation before it, that the matter may come within the
purview of section 303 or of the Antidumping Act, 1921, it
shall promptly notify the Secretary of the Treasury so that
such action may be taken as is otherwise authorized by such
section and such Act.
And the legislative history explains:
It is expected that the Commission's practice of not investi-
gating matters clearly within the purview of either section
303 or the Antidumping Act will continue.'
Thus, it is necessary to examine whether Congress intended that
the Commission simply notify the Secretary of the Treasury or
whether it intended that the Commission notify Treasury and
cease its own investigation of the matter.
The Commission has appeared to indicate it will only con-
sider the question of grants, subsidies or bounties bestowed on
articles of manufacture for export when the use of such incentives
forms a part of a larger scheme or undertaking which may be an
unfair act or unfair method of competition within the purview
of the statute.' 9 In this manner, the Commission will be con-
sidering grants, subsidies and bounties as one of the facts which
may be relevant to the broader scheme alleged in the complaint.
By considering improper incentives in this limited application,
the Commission will not be undertaking a determination of viola-
tion of section 303 and will not be in conflict with the proposition
17. See section V, History of United States Antidumping Law, infra notes
143-201 and accompanying text.
18. SENATE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE, REPORT ON H.R. 10710, S. REP. No. 93-1298,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 195 (1974) [hereinafter, FINANCE COMMITTEE REPORT].
19. Color TV Sets, supra note 9, Commission Memorandum Opinion at 5-6.
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that jurisdiction over countervailing duty determinations is vested
in the Secretary of the Treasury. °
While the countervailing duty laws seem to lend themselves
to relatively clear lines of distinction with respect to section 337,
this is not true of the antidumping laws. It is in the antidumping
area that the greater jurisdictional problem exists. In order prop-
erly to analyze the problem, the history of the pertinent statutes
should be examined. Therefore, a description of present practice
and a review of the history of (1) non-patent section 337 allega-
tions, (2) countervailing duty law, (3) antidumping law and (4)
the law of predatory pricing are presented in following sections.
III. HISTORY OF NON-PATENT SECTION 337 JURISDICTION
In the first few years after the initial passage of section 337,21
five nonpatent unfair competition complaints were filed with the
Commission: Lumber and Timber,22 Petroleum and Refined
Products, 3 Steel Brass Plated Upholstery Nails,24 Toothbrushes2 5
and Ammonium Sulphate.2 0 The Commission informally dis-
missed all of these complaints without an investigation, in most
cases finding that there were adequate remedies under other
provisions of law, that violations had stopped, and that the com-
plaints did not allege a violation of section 337.
It was not until 1939 that another unfair competition com-
plaint was filed at the Commission in Mexican Totoaba or Sea
Bass.2 7 This complaint alleged
... that the alleged unlawful acts of the Mexican Cooperativos
are preventing the handling of this product by American
20. While the Commission in its Memorandum Opinion in Color TV Sets has
said that "section 337 is an authority of concurrent jurisdiction with all other statutes
applicable to unfair practices in import trade," since in most cases bounties or grants
are actions of a foreign government it would appear that such activities would not be
the type of unfair methods of competition or unfair acts contemplated by section 337.
21. Section 337 was enacted as part of the Tariff Act of 1930 and had a pre-
decessor, section 316 of the Tariff Act of 1922. For more information concerning
predecessor section 316, see Kaye & Plaia, 1975, supra note 3, Ch. II. History of
Section 337.
22. Filed on May 29, 1931, by the National Lumber Manufacturing Association.
23. Filed on November 25, 1931, by the Public Service Commission, Topeka, Kan.
24. Filed on February 16, 1932, by Beardsley and Wolcott Manufacturing Co.
25. Filed on April 4, 1932, by Meuller, Phipps & Nicoll, Ltd.
26. Filed on January 20, 1933, by Interlake Iron Corporation.
27. Filed February 18, 1939, by Sonara Fish Company of Tucson, Ariz.
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Commerce either within Mexico or within the United States
and that the alleged unlawful acts of the Mexican Coopera-
tivos restrain and monopolize trade and commerce in the
United States; and that the acts of the Mexican Coopera-
tivos in barring American Commerce in the catching, hauling
or buying of fish within Mexico is in violation of sections
337 and 338 of the 1930 Tariff Act and that the exclusive
hauling, handling and selling of the Mexican Totoaba or Sea
Bass within the United States by the Mexican Cooperativos
is unfair, discriminatory and unlawful. 28
In dismissing this complaint, the Commission said:
The Mexican Government has a plenary power to grant
to its nationals the exclusive right to fish in Mexican waters
or to deal in fishery products; also, the fact that the Mexican
Government has permitted the establishment of cooperatives
which may monopolize the trade does not constitute a viola-
tion of section 337. It may be noted in passing that the
general rule of governments throughout the world is to re-
strict to their own nationals fishing rights in territorial
waters, and that exceptions to this rule are invariably predi-
cated upon special circumstances. This general rule is appli-
cable in some of the territorial waters of the United States.
Further, the United States permits combinations of its citi-
zens for the purpose of engaging in export trade (Webb
Pomerene Act).
The exclusive sales contract between the Mexican Co-
operativos and Mr. Hugh Reeves does not of itself constitute
an unfair method of competition. Exclusive sales contracts
are usual in many lines of business, and while they may
operate with hardship upon persons who had previously en-
gaged in the business, they are not "unfair" within the
meaning of the law.'
In 1952, a complaint was filed alleging that Italian and
Spanish almonds were being sold in the United States at "less
than fair value and/or cost of production." ° The complaint
28. Sea Bass, complaint filed February 15, 1939, at 2.
29. Letter of Raymond B. Stevens, Chairman, dated March 31, 1939.
30. Almonds, complaint filed April 3, 1952, by the California Almond Growers
Exchange, at 2.
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further alleged that sales of almonds were involved in improper
exchange transactions in the United States. The complainant
asserted that these activities constituted unfair methods of com-
petition under section 337.31 Simultaneous with the filing of
the section 337 complaint, an antidumping complaint was filed
with the Secretary of the Treasury under the Antidumping Act
of 1921.2 The section 337 complaint was informally dismissed by
the Commission.33 The complaint was dismissed on the basis
that there were adequate remedies under other provisions of
law, more specifically, the Antidumping Act of 1921. In dis-
missing the complaint the Commission stated:
The material submitted shows that the basis of the
charge of unfair methods of competition and unfair acts in
the importation of almonds is the alleged existence or threat
of dumping within the meaning of the Antidumping Act of
1921. The same information submitted in support of the
request for investigation under section 337 has been pre-
sented to the Treasury Department in support of com-
plaints filed with that Department by the California Almond
Growers Exchange seeking action under the Antidumping
Act. These complaints are now pending before that De-
partment.
The Commission has never considered dumping within
the meaning of the Antidumping Act of 1921, as constituting
a basis for action either under section 337 of the Tariff Act
of 1930 or its antecedent provision, section 316 of the Tariff
Act of 1922. Complaints of dumping submitted to the Com-
mission have always been referred to the Treasury Depart-
ment for appropriate consideration under the Antidumping
Act. Accordingly, the Commission does not regard the mate-
rial submitted in behalf of the California Almond Growers
Exchange as a complaint which it should consider under
section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, and the request for
investigated is, therefore, denied.3"
31. Letter to President Truman from John Breckinridge, dated April 3, 1952.
32. Bureau of Customs File No. 6433, complaint filed on April 3, 1952.
33. See letter of Donn N. Bent, Secretary of the Commission, to Pope, Ballard
& Loos, dated April 10, 1952.
34. Id.
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It is interesting to note that the Commission action appar-
ently fails to deal with the allegations concerning improper ex-
change transactions and sales below cost, either of which arguably
transcends the metes and bounds of statutory dumping under
the Antidumping Act of 1921. A few weeks later the complainant
filed a Petition for Reconsideration. 35 In its Memorandum in
Support of Petition, the complainant cited language from Senate
Reports on the Tariff Act of 192216 and the Tariff Act of 193037
and stated:
The conclusions derived from the statutory history of
this section lead to an opposite result from that of the Tariff
Commission. Congress intended Section 337 to cover all
kinds of unfair acts; it intended that this Section should
present a more adequate remedy than the antidumping
statutes, and it was an unmistakable effort to protect do-
mestic producers from unfair competitive practices and acts
of foreign producers. 3
In acting on the petition, the Commission did not elaborate on
the basis for its position other than to make the conclusory state-
ment that the Commission did not consider dumping within the
meaning of section 337.39
Later in 1952, a complaint was filed concerning rabbit skins.
The complaint alleged discriminatory application of ocean freight
rates by steamship companies to rabbit skins, thereby bestowing
on U.S. consignees an unlawful competitive advantage in the U.S.
market.40 The Commission again refused to take jurisdiction in
the matter stating as its basis:
The alleged unfair acts amount to a charge of false
billing or false classification in violation of section 16 of the
Shipping Act of 1916, as amended (U.S.C.A., title 46, sec.
815). Section 22 of the Shipping Act of 1916, as amended,
(U.S.C.A. title 46, sec. 821) vests in the Federal Maritime
35. Re-Application for Immediate Investigation, dated April 23, 1952.
36. S. REP. No. 595, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1922).
37. S. REP. No. 37, 71st Cong., 1st Sess. (1930).
38. Memorandum In Support of Petition for Reconsideration, Almonds, supra
note 30, at 1-2.
39. Letter of Donn N. Bent, Secretary of the Commission, dated May 22, 1952.
40. Rabbit Fur, complaint filed May 12, 1952, by The Hatters' Fur Cutters
Association of the U.S.A., complaint at 2.
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Board jurisdiction to investigate alleged violations of section
16 upon sworn complaint. The Commission, therefore, does
not regard the complaint of The Hatters' Fur Cutters Asso-
ciation of the U.S.A. as one which it should consider for the
purposes of section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, and has not
accepted the complaint as one which was properly filed with
the Tariff Commission.4'
In 1959, a complaint was filed at the Commission alleging
patent infringement in the importation of Zigzag Sewing Ma-
chines.42 At the request of the Justice Department,48 the Com-
mission held in abeyance its decision on the merits of the Com-
mission investigation until final action had been taken in the
courts. The district court rendered a judgment in favor of the
complainant, Singer.44 However, on appeal to the Supreme Court,
the judgment of the district court was reversed. In pointing to
the Commission action, the Court stated:
Moreover this overriding common design to exclude the
Japanese machines in the United States is clearly illustrated
by Singer's action before the United States Tariff Commis-
sion. Less than eight months after the patent was issued it
started this effort to bar infringers in one sweep. As an
American corporation, it was the sole company of the three
that was able to bring such an action. When it appeared
that the references to Pfaff in the assignment agreement
threatened the success of the Tariff Commission proceeding,
Gegauf consented to the deletion of Pfaff from the agree-
ment. This maneuver was for the purpose, as the trial court
found, of giving Singer "'a better chance of prevailing before
the Tariff Commission' in its efforts to exclude" infringing
machines. 205 F. Supp. at 427. While the tariff application
was leveled against nine European as well as the Japanese
competitors, the allegations were clearly beamed at the in-
41. Letter of Donn IN. Bent, Secretary of the Commission, dated May 23, 1952.
42. Certain Household Zigzag Sewing Machines, filed by Singer Manufacturing
Co. on January 15, 1959.
43. Zigzag Sewing Machines, supra note 42, letters of Robert A. Bicks, Acting
Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice, dated May 15, 1959, and Septem-
ber 21, 1959.
44. United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 205 F. Supp. 394 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
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fringing Japanese machines to which Singer attributed the
destruction of all American domestic household sewing ma-
chine companies save itself. As the parties to the agree-
ments and assignment well knew, and as the trial court
itself stated, "[b]y far the largest number of infringers of
the Gegauf patent and invention were the Japanese." 205
F. Supp. at 418.11
In 1963, as a result of the Supreme Court's decision, Singer re-
quested and was allowed to withdraw its Commission complaint.
In 1964, a complaint was filed alleging a combination and
conspiracy to restrain and monopolize trade and commerce in
jeweled-lever watches, watch movements and watch parts, by
certain foreign watch manufacturers and the U.S. importers of
their merchandise. The complainants alleged that the foreign
manufacturers and their U.S. importers had: been and were con-
spiring to restrain unreasonably and monopolize United States
trade and commerce in watches, watch movements and watch
parts; combined and conspired to eliminate the manufacture of
watches and watch parts in the United States; unlawfully con-
trolled distribution of watches and watch parts in the United
States; agreed to fix prices on watches and watch movements
imported into the United States; discriminated in prices charged
for watches and watch parts; and conducted a continuing sur-
veillance and invoked sanctions and penalties as a means of
enforcing the restrictions imposed.4"
The Commission conducted an investigation into the matter
but found no unfair methods of competition or unfair acts. During
the pendency of the Commission's investigation, an order was
issued by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York enjoining a number of the parties named in the Com-
mission complaint from further actions in pursuit of what the
court found to be a combination and conspiracy, and further
requiring the renunciation of the undertakings which gave rise
to the unlawful combination and conspiracy.47 The basis for the
45. United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 195-96 (1963).
46. Watches, Watch Movements, and Watch Parts, Tariff Comm'n Pub. 177,
June 1966.
47. United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, C.A. No.
96-170 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). For decision denying defendants motion to dismiss for lack
of jurisdiction, see 133 F. Supp. 40.
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Commission's finding of no unfair methods of competition or
unfair acts was expressed as follows:
In view of the rather special circumstances outlined in the
preceding paragraph, [the Order of the district court] and
the fact that the remedy provided by section 337 does not
operate in retrospect, it was manifest that, once section 337
proceedings had been initiated, the task of the Commission
was to conduct an investigation which would fully develop
the facts, and, on the basis of the record thereby established,
to determine whether the alleged combination and conspiracy
was viable and in violation of the provisions of section 337.
Had the order of the U.S. District Court not intervened in
the period before the institution of the Commission's investi-
gation and after the acts and practices on the basis of which
the court found violation of the Sherman and Wilson acts,
the issues before the Commission might have been different.
Section 337, however, does not provide for refusal from entry
in perpetuity, but only until the President finds that the
conditions which led to such refusal from entry no longer
exist. Therefore, and because the intervening order of the
court was followed by corrective measures taken in compli-
ance therewith, the Commission has confined its conclusions
generally to the circumstances extant after the court's final
order.4 8
After Watches and Zigzag Sewing Machines, the Commission
received a complaint concerning ceramic wall tile.4 9 The com-
plaint alleged that Japanese manufacturers and the U.S. im-
porters of their merchandise:
1. combined and conspired to fix prices of ceramic mosaic
tile and glazed wall tile imported into the United States;
2. misrepresented the country of origin;
3. initiated and misappropriated trademarks and trade
names;
4. violated the antidumping laws of the United States;
48. Watches, rupra note 46, at 7-8.
49. Ceramic Wall Tile, complaint filed March 29, 1966.
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5. received rebates and subsidies from the Japanese govern-
ment;
6. divided and allocated markets and customers in the United
States;
7. attempted to monopolize the ceramic floor tile and wall
tile markets; and
8. violated the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Naviga-
tion between the United States and Japan.
After inquiry with respect to the allegations of the complaint,
the Commission refused to initiate an investigation, stating:
The complaint alleges that certain acts or practices "violate
Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, Section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act, the Antidumping Act of
1921, Section 73 of the Wilson Tariff Act, Section 337 of the
Tariff Act, as amended, and other statutes of the United
States" (Complaint, p. 123). On page 124 of the complaint
it is stated, "The unlawful conduct of defendants shown
herein is readily within the reach of basic antitrust prohibi-
tions." The invocation of section 337 is sought on the grounds
that relief afforded under the Sherman Act or the Federal
Trade Commission Act is inadequate.
The Commission is of the view that inadequacy of relief af-
forded under the antitrust and other statutes claimed to be
violated cannot be presumed. The Commission is further
of the view that an investigation under section 337 is not
warranted in the premises unless the acts or practices com-
plained of have been dealt with under the antitrust laws or
section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act and the
relief afforded under these statutes has been found wanting10
The modern era of Commission activism in unfair trade viola-
tions other than patent infringement began in 1968, when a com-
plaint was filed at the Commission regarding crawler tractor
parts.51 The complaint alleged a conspiracy and combination to
50. Ceramic Wall Tile, supra note 49, letter of Donn N. Bent; Secretary of the
Commission, dated May 10, 1966.
51. Tractor Parts, complaint filed November 1, 1968, opinion at Tariff Comm'n
Pub. 443, December 1971.
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boycott and cut off the complainant and others from importing
and selling certain crawler tractor parts in the United States. The
complainant named the foreign manufacturer and nine importer-
distributors as the parties to the alleged conspiracy. The Com-
mission considered and denied respondents' motion for dismissal
for lack of jurisdiction and also refused their application for a
stay of the proceedings, stating:
Any incidental relief afforded to the complaining witness by
reason of the issuance of an exclusion order under section
337 would be "in addition to any other provision of law."
Such relief would be both complementary and supplementary
in nature. There is no basis in law for not enforcing the
provisions of section 337 because they do not afford every
form of remedy an aggrieved party may wish to obtain.
The availability of the subject tractor parts to non-conspira-
tor importers, should there be a finding of conspiracy in this
case, would, as explained above, obviate any argument of
possible prejudice to the public.52
The respondents immediately petitioned the District Court for
the District of Columbia asking the court to enjoin the Commis-
sion from continuing its investigation. 53 The court denied the
motion for a temporary restraining order stating that it lacked
subject-matter jurisdiction.54 Although the Commission found a
combination and conspiracy between the foreign manufacturer
and its U.S. distributors, no exclusion order was recommended
to the President since the Commission further found that "the
specific unfair method or act.., no longer exists." Commissioner
Sutton explained as follows:
My recommending against the issuance of an exclusion order
is wholly consistent with the provisions of section 337. Sec-
tion 337 (g) provides that -
Any refusal of entry under this section shall continue in
effect until the President shall find and instruct the Sec-
52. Tractor Parts, supra note 51, Tariff Comm'n Pub. 443 at A 51-52.
53. Bertoni and Cotti v. U.S. Tariff Commission, C.A. No. 1923-69, July 16, 1969.
54. This occurred under the prior statute, which provided for the Commission to
make recommendations to the President. For more information on this point, see
Kaye & Plaia, 1975 srupra note 3.
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retary of the Treasury that the conditions which led to
such refusal of entry no longer exist.
Clearly, if the violation of the statute no longer exists at
the time the Commission reports on the full investigation,
there is no justification for the Commission to recommend,
or for the President to issue an order of exclusion. Reasoning
to the same effect was given by the Commission in its report
on Investigation No. 337-19."5
Further, in confirming that there is no necessity to show
injury to a domestic industry in antitrust-type section 337 cases,
the Commission stated:
The allegation that the complainant must claim and prove
injury to a domestic industry is untenable. Section 337 directs
the imposition of an exclusion order in a case where an un-
fair method or act has the effect or tendency "to restrain
or monopolize trade and commerce in the United States"
irrespective of whether a domestic industry is experiencing
injury. Indeed, section 337 could apply whether or not there
is a U.S. industry producing the article involved in an un-
fair method or act. It is a statute designd to protect the
"public interest" in maintaining fair practices in trade.56
In 1972, a complaint was filed concerning certain convertible
game tables.57 After a full investigation, it is noteworthy that
a majority of the Commissioners found:
In addition to our determination of unfair methods of com-
petition and unfair acts concerning the patent issues in-
volved, it is our view that [respondent], an importer of the
subject convertible game tables, has, through its wholly
owned subsidiary,... engaged in the deceptive trade prac-
tice of advertising a fictitious regular price for the imported
tables.5
Since infringement of a U.S. patent was also found, an exclusion
order was recommended through the date of expiration of the
55. Tractor Parts, supra note 51 at A-45.
56. Id.
57. Convertible Game Tables and Components Thereof, complaint filed October
26, 1972, Inv. No. 337-TA-34, opinion at Tariff Comm'n Pub. 705, December 1975.
58. Convertible Game Tables, supra note 57, Tariff Comm'n Pub. 705 at 19.
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patent. Regarding the deceptive pricing practices, one Commis-
sioner noted:
Commissioner Leonard points out that an exclusion order
based upon the advertising of a fictitious regular price would
be a less comprehensive remedy than one issued on the
basis of the patent since it would run only against Armac
Enterprises, Inc., and/or Rozel Industries, Inc. He also
points out that it would probably be a remedy of much
shorter duration. In his view, should there be a resumption
of import trade in convertible game tables by the above-
named concerns at the time the patent expires (May 2,
1986) or is terminated, the matter of the advertising of a
fictitious regular price might be examined anew by the Com-
mission and an appropriate recommendation could then be
formulated. 59
Under the present statute, the Commission may issue cease and
desist orders in such instances.
In 1973 a complaint was filed containing allegations of a
group boycott and refusal to deal.60 While a Preliminary Inquiry
was instituted by the Commission, before the Commission could
complete further action on the complaint, the case was settled
on agreement of the parties. Shortly after the filing of the Dual
In-Line Reed Relays case, a patent-based complaint was filed in-
volving certain electronic resistors.61 The complaint raised alle-
gations of antidumping violations and countervailing duty viola-
tions. In discussing these matters during a hearing, the Chairman
of the Commission suggested to complainant that these matters
be taken up with the Treasury Department,62 and the Com-
mission dismissed the investigation without issuing a written
decision.
In 1973 a complaint was filed with the Commission involving
electronic audio equipment. 6  The complaint alleged that the
foreign manufacturer and its U.S. distributor had unlawfully
refused to deal with complainant and had illegally maintained
59. Id. at 22 n.1.
60. Dual In-Line Reed Relays, Inv. No. 337-L-61, complaint filed March 27, 1973.
61. Preset Variable Resistance Controls, Inv. No. 337-L-63, complaint filed
April 16, 1973.
62. Id., transcript, vol. 1, p. 220.
63. Certain Electronic Audio and Related Equipment, complaint filed July 10,
1973, Inv. No. 337-TA-7, opinion at USITC Pub. 768, April 1976.
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a fair trade pricing program in a non-fair trade jurisdiction. Upon
completion of its investigation, the Commission found that there
was no violation of section 337. The recommended determina-
tion, as adopted by the Commission, described Commission juris-
diction in antitrust-type cases:
Section 337 addresses itself to "unfair methods of competi-
tion and unfair acts" which occur "in the importation of
articles into the United States, or in their sale . . ." (Em-
phasis added). Moreover, the statute requires that such sale
be made by an "owner, importer, consignee, or agent of
either." Therefore, (1) if an article is imported into the
United States and (2) if such article is sold in the United
States by an owner, importer, consignee, or agent of either,
and (3) such sale in the United States constitutes an unfair
method of competition and unfair act, the Commission may
exercise jurisdiction, and, unless there are overriding public
policy considerations, issue an exclusion or cease and desist
order. This construction obviates the necessity of extending
the words beyond their plain meaning to arrive at the in-
tention of the legislature. In short, the positive words of
the statute, coupled with their particular construction, re-
flect a manifestation of intent, and such words and construc-
tion further reflect a policy which Congress intended to see
implemented. 64
Respondents argued that there must be a nexus between the
importation and the alleged unfair acts. The recommended de-
termination, as adopted, rejected this contention stating:
[A] nexus is not required between the time the merchandise
is exported and the time the merchandise is imported into
the United States. If the unfair act is committed in the sale
of imported articles in the United States by an importer, for
example, the Commission may take jurisdiction. 65
The opinion clarified the relationship of section 337 to other
unfair competition laws as follows:
[S]ection 337, not unlike section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, is intended to cover certain unfair methods
of competition which are deemed to be violations of other
64. Id. at 28.
65. Id. at 29.
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antitrust regulations; but at the same time I recognize the
jurisdictional limitations in section 337, regarding imported
merchandise.
Therefore, I agree with complainant's threshold submis-
sion applicable to this proceeding, that if there is found a
violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act or, in fact, of sec-
tion 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, there may also
be a violation of section 337.66
Finally, the broadness of section 337 jurisdiction was spelled
out:
[T] his opinion is the first antitrust-related recommendation
by a Presiding Officer or Administrative Law Judge of the
U.S. International Trade Commission since the passage of
the Trade Act of 1974. In order for a just determination to
be made, the facts in this particular proceeding necessitated
an examination of how section 337 relates to other domestic
antitrust laws. However, it is believed that section 337 is
a unique statute, applicable to the importation of merchan-
dise, and therefore may reach conduct which might not apply
to other antitrust laws.6 7
The Commission's exercise of jurisdiction in both Electronic
Audio Equipment and Convertible Game Tables was the subject
of advice from the Federal Trade Commission. The Federal
Trade Commission took the position that in these cases the
unfair pricing complaints involved purely domestic trade and
had no nexus to importation which would fall within the scope
of section 337 jurisdiction.6 The Justice Department took a
similar position in Convertible Game Tables stating:
In this case, there is no proven or even alleged involvement
of a foreign manufacturer or other foreign person in the
66. Id. at 31. In 1974, one commentator expressed a contrary view, stating "it
is to be hoped the Commission will send the complainants to the Department of Justice
or the Federal Trade Commission. For a variety of reasons, which we shall now
consider, Section 337 is ill-suited for antitrust purposes." LaRue, Section 337 of the
1930 Tariff Act and Its Section 5 FTC Act Counterpart, 43 ABA ANTITRUST L.J.
608, 615 (1974).
67. Electronic Audio Equipment, supra note 63, USITC Pub. 768 at 47.
68. Electronic Audio Equipment, supra note 63, letter of Charles A. Tobin,
Secretary, Federal Trade Commission, dated March 9, 1976.
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pricing and advertising practices of [respondent]. The con-
duct appears to be well removed from the importation of the
goods in question. The alleged unfair practices are absolutely
within the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission
or local consumer protection officials. The only possible juris-
dictional bases seem to be that the goods are imported or
that the importer of the goods in question is affiliated with
the retailer. The recommended cease and desist order thus
appears to be an improper assertion by the Commission of
Section 337 jurisdiction. Mere retail sales of imported prod-
ucts do not appear to be within the jurisdictional penumbra
of Section 337 without a showing of sufficient international
nexus.
69
Notwithstanding the position of these agencies, the Commission
exercised jurisdiction.
A complaint regarding coffee was filed in 1974.70 The com-
plaint alleged that the respondents, coffee companies and pro-
ducers, in concert and conspiracy with each other, agreed and
sought to impose an artificially high price on Angolan coffee. The
complaint also alleged:
This agreement has as it purpose the financial gain of all the
respondents and perhaps others presently unknown to the
complainants. As part of the agreement, the respondents
have also sought to impose an embargo and boycott against
the complainants and perhaps others for (a) refusing to co-
operate and become parties to the agreement and (b) re-
fusing to pay the unreasonably inflated prices demanded by
the conspiring respondents. The effect and tendency of this
unfair method of competition and these unfair acts is, in
the short run, substantially to injure the coffee importing
industry in the United States and the complainants in par-
ticular and, in the long run, substantially to injure the coffee
industry in the United States and the consuming public. 71
The case was terminated by the Commission after the parties
before the Commission concluded a settlement agreement.
69. Convertible Game Tables, supra note 57, letter of Thomas E. Kauper, Assistant
Attorney General, Antitrust Division, dated March 4, 1976, at 4.
70. Certain Angolan Robusta Coffee, complaint filed November 26, 1974, Inv.
No. 337-TA-16.
71. Id., complaint, at 23-24.
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In 1974, another complaint was filed concerning certain high
fidelity equipment. 2 While the case was pending before the
Commission, consent orders to cease and desist were entered into
with the FTC and settlement agreements entered into by all
parties. On this basis, the Commission terminated its investi-
gation.
A complaint involving eye testing instruments was filed in
1974 alleging misleading and deceptive advertising practices.73
The case was settled by the parties prior to Commission action
on the merits.
In the Reclosable Plastic Bags case,74 the Commission con-
sidered alleged antitrust violations which were raised by re-
spondent as a defense. The violations alleged were characterized
by the Commission:
The antitrust charges by respondent Ades are raised as a
defense to a finding of violation under section 337, and fall
basically into four different categories. The first is the charge
of division of markets, the second is the charge of accumula-
tion of patents, the third is the charge of a grant-back provi-
sion, and the fourth is the charge of exclusive dealership. 75
After consideration of the antitrust allegations, the Commission
determined that there was no basis for the defenses.
A complaint filed in 1976 alleged an unlawful contract, com-
bination or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce in color
television receivers in the United States and a combination or
conspiracy or attempt to monopolize such trade and commerce. 7
The complaint alleged that respondents attempted to obstruct
the free market prices of color television receivers in the United
States through predatory pricing schemes and receipt of economic
benefits and incentives from the Government of Japan which
contributed to below-cost and unreasonably low cost pricing of
such television sets in the United States.
72. Certain High Fidelity Audio and Related Equipment, complaint filed Novem-
ber 12, 1974, Inv. No. 337-TA-14.
73. Certain Eye Testing Instruments Incorporating Refractional Principles, com-
plaint filed February 20, 1974, Inv. No. 337-TA-6.
74. Reclosable Plastic Bags, Inv. No. 337-TA-22, USITC Pub. 801, January
1977.
75. Id., at 10.
76. Color TV Sets, supra note 9, complaint filed January 15, 1976.
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Respondents unsuccessfully argued that the Commission did
not have jurisdiction because the causes recited in the complaint
were antidumping and countervailing duty violations and should
be investigated by the Department of Treasury.77 Before the
Commission reviewed the ruling and issued a written decision
and opinion, review was sought in federal district court.78 In
addition to finding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the
Court said:
In this case, nothing in the papers or argument before this
court shows that the Commission proceeding which plaintiff
wishes enjoined or declared unlawful (Commission Investi-
gation No. 337-TA-23, "Certain Color Television Receivers")
is in excess of the Commission's jurisdiction under 19 U.S.C.
1337 (a), or that the Commission otherwise acted in a manner
that is clearly at odds with the specific language of the
Commission's statutory authority. World Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. United States International Trade Commission, 414
F. Supp. 713, 717 (D.D.C. 1976).9
Subsequent to the court's decision,"° the Commission found
that it had jurisdiction even though certain allegations of the
complaint may encompass antidumping law or countervailing
duty violations.
Later, a section 2011 complaint was filed and the Commission
suspended the section 337 investigation until the section 201
report was sent to the President, at which time the section 337
investigation was resumed.82
77. Id., Presiding Officer's Opinion in Support of Ruling Denying Amended
Motions to Terminate and Dismiss, issued July 19, 1976.
78. Melco Sales v. U.S.I.T.C., Civil Action No. 76-1932 (D.D.C. 1976).
79. Id., Order filed November 15, 1976. Further, in response to a challenge to
Commission authority, the court found ample protection within the statute concerning
the executive prerogatives in foreign affairs.
80. Color TV Sets, supra note 9, Memorandum Opinion.
81. Section 201(b) of the Trade Act of 1974, Television Receivers, Color and
Monochrome, Assembled or Not Assembled, Finished or Not Finished, and Sub-
assemblies Thereof, Inv. No. TA-201-19, complaint received September 22, 1976,
investigation instituted October 21, 1976. Report issued at USITC Pub. 808,
March 1977.
82. Notice of Suspension in the section 337 Color TV Sets investigation was
published December 23, 1976, at 41 Fed. Reg. 55947 and was stated to "remain in
force and effect only during the pendency of investigation No. TA-201-19."
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Predatory pricing was an issue in the Swimming Pools cases3
filed in 1976. The Presiding Officer's recommended determination
indicates that there was an inquiry into home market and third
country sales of pools and testimony that sales in certain foreign
countries were at prices no higher than in the United States.
The Presiding Officer found:
The complaint filed in this investigation alleged, on in-
formation and belief, that [foreign manufacturer] and the
named respondents are importing and selling [swimming
pools] at prices "below fair market value" and the "manu-
facturer's cost of production" and that the sale by [foreign
manufacturer] of such pools "below fair market value" is
founded upon a "predatory price policy. '8 4
The Commission's Notice of Investigation stated that the
scope of the investigation included a consideration of
whether the effect or tendency of an alleged policy of preda-
tory pricing in the domestic sale of such merchandise is to
destroy or substantially injure an industry, efficiently and
economically operated, in the United States or to restrain
or monopolize trade and commerce in the United States.8 5
The Presiding Officer said:
This Commission first referred to the parallelism between
the language of Section 337 and that of Section 5 of the FTC
Act in 1922:
Section 316 extends to import trade practically the same
prohibition against unfair methods of competition which
the Federal Trade Commission Act provides against un-
fair methods of competition in interstate commerce. Sixth
Annual Report of the U.S. Tariff Commission (Washing-
ton, D.C. 1922), at 3.86
The Recommended Determination continued:
In the area of predatory pricing, the F.T.C. has found
selling below cost or at otherwise unreasonably low prices
83. Above-Ground Swimming Pools, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-25.
84. Id., Recommended Determination [hereinafter, R.D.] of February 10, 1977,
at 61.
85. Id., Notice of Investigation, 41 Fed. Reg. 17975, April 29, 1976.
86. Id., R.D. at 63.
THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW JOURNAL
with the intent, purpose and effect of restraining and lessen-
ing competition to be in violation of Section 5. See, In the
Matter of Quaker Oats Company, 66 FTC 1131 (1963). 87
In his Recommended Determination, the Presiding Officer dis-
cussed the 1916 Antidumping Act, noting that "the investigative
Staff argued that the Presiding Officer could find that [the foreign
manufacturer] has sold [the subject articles] at prices low enough
to be considered as made in violation of the 1916 Act, and there-
fore, of Section 337."''s The Presiding Officer held, however, that
this was outside the scope of the investigation as instituted by the
Commission.
Citing Zenith v. Matsushita"9 as support, the Presiding Officer
stated:
that the Robinson-Patman Act did not reach geographical
price discrimination where the alleged violation involved im-
port transactions in the United States, on the one hand, and
transactions which occurred wholly within foreign countries,
on the other.90
The Presiding Officer reasoned that this statement was made
in partial reliance
on the enactment of antidumping legislation in 1916 and
1921 prohibiting price discrimination between national mar-
kets subsequent to the 1914 Clayton Act and on considera-
tion that prior to 1936, neither Congress nor the executive
department and agencies charged with the enforcement of
the antitrust statutes thought that the Clayton Act reached
price discrimination between national markets.9
And as a conclusion of law the Presiding Officer found, "A
policy of predatory pricing is an unfair method of competition
and unfair act as defined in Section 337. "192
87. Id. at 64.
88. Id. at 66.
89. Zenith Radio v. Matsushita Elec. Ind., 402 F. Supp. 244, 251 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
90. Swimming Pools, supra note 83, R.D. at 69.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 74.
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Later in 1976, a complaint was filed concerning chicory.9 The
complaint alleged various antitrust violations.
In determining that there was no reason to believe there was
a violation, the Commission set forth its position on the relation-
ship of section 337 to the antitrust laws:
These alleged violations of section 337 pertain to activity
which could constitute forbidden activity under sections 1
and 2 of the Sherman Act. Although there are no judicial
precedents involving nonpatent cases arising under section
337, judicial determinations under other antitrust and unfair
competition statutes are persuasive in determining what
constitutes an unfair method or act under section 337. The
Commission has in previous investigations, both under the
prior section 337 and under section 337 as it exists today,
used the antitrust laws and the practice thereunder as a
standard for "unfair methods of competition and unfair acts."
The presiding officer recommends this in the instant investi-
gation and we adopt such recommendation. [Footnotes
omitted] .9
IV. HISTORY OF UNITED STATES
COUNTERVAILING DUTY LAW
Countervailing duties have been explained as follows:
When export bounties ... either direct or indirect, are
paid upon goods, such bounties neutralize more or less the
duties that may be charged upon their importation into
other countries and the protection thereby accorded. To
re-establish the original amount of protection, the importing
country may provide that for articles upon which export
bounties are paid a protective surtax shall be charged.95
A. Present Countervailing Duty Proceedings
In the United States
The current countervailing duty law as amended by the Trade
Act of 1974, provides:
Whenever any country, .. . other political subdivision
of government, . . . [or] person . . . shall pay or bestow,
93. Chicory Root - Crude and Prepared, complaint filed June 11, 1976, Inv. No.
337-TA-27.
94. Id., Commission Memorandum Opinion, October 1, 1976, at 9.
95. U.S. TARIFF COMMISSION, DICTIONARY OF TARIFF INFORMATION at 205 (1924).
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directly or indirectly, any bounty or grant upon the manu-
facture or production or export of any article or merchandise
manufactured or produced in such country, . . . then upon
the importation of such article or merchandise into the
United States,... there shall be levied and paid, in all such
cases, in addition to any duties otherwise imposed, a duty
equal to the net amount of such bounty or grant, however
the same be paid or bestowed."6
In the case of articles which are duty free, countervailing
duties may be imposed only if there is a finding of a bounty or
grant and in addition, a determination of injury. 7 The injury
finding is made by the International Trade Commission.
In order to initiate an investigation a petition is filed with
the Secretary of the Treasury. It appears to be mandatory that
the Secretary take action on the petition. The statute reads:
upon the filing of a petition by any person setting forth his
belief that a bounty or grant is being paid or bestowed, and
the reasons therefor,... the Secretary shall initiate a formal
investigation to determine whether or not any bounty or
grant is being paid or bestowed and shall publish in the
Federal Register notice of the initiation of such investi-
gation.9
The Secretary must make a preliminary determination within
six months from the date on which the petition is filed and within
twelve months from such date shall make a final determination.
96. 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a) (1).
97. One reason that duty-free articles can have countervailing duties imposed
only if there is a finding of injury as well as a finding of a bounty, is that this
addition of inclusion of duty free articles to the law was made by the Trade Act of
1974 and thus subsequent to the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT),
which was signed in 1947. GATT provides that countervailing duties may only be
imposed when bounties or grants are being bestowed and such bounties or grants
are the cause of injury. Because of a grandfather clause (the United States counter-
vailing duty law predated the 1947 GATT), the United States was not required by the
treaty to impose the injury requirement. However, the United States countervailing
duty law at that time only affected dutiable articles. Since, by the Trade Act of 1974,
non-dutiable items are now to be included within the provisions of countervailing duty
law, in order to conform to GATT it was necessary for an injury requirement to
be imposed.
98. 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a) (3).
99. 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a) (4).
SECTION 337 JURISDICTION
In order to provide for proper negotiating authority and
avoid disruption of multilateral trade negotiations, the stat-
ute provides that during the four-year period beginning January
3, 1975, under certain circumstances, the Secretary may deter-
mine that the additional duty under this section will not be
imposed.100
Under Treasury regulations, a petition for institution of a
countervailing duty investigation should contain:
1. A full statement of the reasons for the belief that any
bounty or grant is being paid or bestowed with respect to mer-
chandise imported into the United States. A
2. A detailed description or sample of the merchandise. - 1
3. All pertinent facts obtainable as to any bounty or grant
being paid or bestowed with respect to the merchandise. 101
Upon the filing of a proper petition "the Commissioner [of
customs] shall cause such investigation to be made as appears
to be warranted by the circumstances of the case."'10 2
If the information appears to be in error, the party filing it
is so informed. Otherwise, the Commissioner, with the approval
of the Secretary of the Treasury, publishes a notice in the Federal
Register that the communication has been received together with
an invitation to interested persons to submit written comments.
After consideration of the comments and other relevant data,
a determination is made. If it is found that bounties or grants
are being paid or bestowed, the Commissioner of Customs, with
the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury, "shall issue a
countervailing duty order describing the merchandise, desig-
nating the country or area in which it is produced ... and de-
claring the ascertained or estimated amount of the bounty or
grant.' 0 3
B. Countervailing Duty Legislation
Legislation originated in the United States with the Tariff
Act of 1890,104 which provided for the imposition of an additional
100. 19 U.S.C. § 1303(d) (2).
101. 19 C.F.R. § 159.47(b) (1).
102. 19 C.F.R. § 159.47(c).
103. 19 C.F.R. § 159.47(c). The mandatory nature of the imposition of counter-
vailing duties by the Secretary can be seen from the recent decision (April 12, 1977)
in Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, ___ F. Supp. __ (Cust. Ct. 1977) C.D. 4691.
104. 26 Stat. 583.
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duty on sugar exported from a country which paid a higher bounty
on exportation of sugar than on raw sugars of a lower saccharine
content.
The Tariff Act of 1894 expanded the imposition of an addi-
tional duty to all imports of sugar from countries which granted
bounties. 10 5 The primary reason for passage of the statute was
to counteract the dumping of German sugar being made possible
by government bounties.
The law was further broadened by section 5 of the Tariff
Act of 1897106 to cover all imports dutiable under that act which
received a bounty or grant upon exportation, and this provision
was maintained in the Tariff Acts of 1909107 and 1913.108
Section 5 of the Tariff Act of 1897 provided:
whenever any country... shall pay or bestow.., any bounty
or grant upon the exportation of any article or merchandise
from such country . . . and such article or merchandise is
dutiable ... there shall be levied and paid, in all such cases
in addition to the duties otherwise imposed by this Act, an
additional duty equal to the net amount of such bounty or
grant .... 109
Under this statute it was the act of exportation alone and
not production for which the bounty was to be paid. In an early
case under the statute, sugar producers in the Netherlands were
receiving a bounty pursuant to the law of that country. But as
the law operated, only those firms which exported their sugar
kept the bounty. The others eventually had to return it to the
Netherlands government. This was considered a bounty under
the 1897 act.110
The Hills Bros. decision was followed in Downs v. United
States,"' which involved Russian sugar. The Court stated that
the 1897 act "was not only intended to aid in the collection of
revenue, but also to encourage the industries of the United
States ...112 In adopting a large portion of the judgment ren-
105. 28 Stat. 521.
106. 30 Stat. 205.
107. 36 Stat. 11.
108. 38 Stat. 114.
109. 30 Stat. 205.
110. United States v. Hills Bros. Co., 107 F. 107 (2d Cir. 1901).
111. 113 F. 144 (4th Cir. 1902).
112. Id. at 145-46.
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dered by the board of general appraisers,'1 3 the court found that
"[t] he word 'grant' is more comprehensive in meaning than the
term 'bounty'.""4
The first regular countervailing duty law was the 1913 Act. 15
It provided for the Secretary of the Treasury to impose additional
(countervailing) duties when grants or bounties were being paid.
The law was enlarged even further by section 303 of the
Tariff Act of 1922,116 which provided for the inclusion of any
bounty or grant upon manufacture or production in addition to
the act of exportation.
Under section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930 the Secretary
of the Treasury, once he determined a bounty was being granted,
had no discretion but was impelled to impose an additional duty
equal to the amount of the bounty. There was no requirement
that the Secretary act within any particular period of time.
When section 303 of Tariff Act of 1930 was amended by the
Trade Act of 1974, it was stated:
The [Senate Finance] Committee has been concerned
over the past years that the Treasury Department has used
the absence of time limits to stretch out or even shelve
countervailing duty investigations for reasons which have
nothing to do with the clear and mandatory nature of the
countervailing duty law." 7
The House Ways & Means Committee also expressed con-
cern with Treasury performance since "The Committee was ad-
vised in 1970 that the Treasury Department would amend its
regulations to conform to these procedures, and is concerned
that the Treasury has not done so."""
There is no injury requirement under section 303 notwith-
standing the requirements of GATT. The United States is ex-
pected from this requirement because its countervailing duty
law had no injury requirement when GATT was first signed in
1947.
113. Which subsequently became the Customs Court.
114. 113 F. at 147.
115. Section III, paragraph I, of the Tariff Act of October 31, 1913, 38 Stat. 184.
116. 42 Stat. 858.
117. FINANCE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 18, at 183.
118. HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, REPORT ON TRADE REFORM ACT OF
1974, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., H.R. REP. No. 93-571 to accompany H.R. 10710 at 74
(1970) [hereinafter, WAYS AND MEANS REPORT].
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In Hammond Lead Products, Inc. v. United States'" the
court commented on GATT as follows:
The dealing with countervailing duties in the [GATF]
(1947) seems to reflect a belief on the part of Treasury in
1947 that it could veto an assessment of countervailing duties
if it chose, and Congress has not since enacted anything to
contradict that assumption. 120
[T]he modem tendency to fashion a remedy for any
injury is a strong one, and it could be the regular courts
would take jurisdiction in cases outside section 516 (b), where
the domestic industry showed clear illegality and substan-
tial injury.121
In Energetic Worsted Corp. v. United States'22 the court
referred to GATT and pointed out that an additional duty may
be imposed if not more than the estimated bounty or subsidy.
The court further noted that it had previously been held that the
imposition of an additional duty does not violate the most-
favored-nation clause, citing Balfour, Guthrie and Co. v. United
States.23
C. Bounties and Grants
The question of the existence of "bounties" or "grants" has
been dealt with in a number of cases.
The Supreme Court discussed the German government's pro-
viding of a special advantage in the form of a tax concession and
considered this advantage to be a bounty or grant. 24 In Downs
v. United States, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
stated:
[I]t is immaterial in what manner the "bounty or grant"
was paid or bestowed. The law regards substances, not
shadows; things, not names. 25
119. 440 F.2d 1024 (CCPA 1971).
120. Id. at 1031.
121. Id. at 1032.
122. 224 F. Supp. 606 (Cust. Ct. 1963).
123. 136 F.2d 1019 (CCPA 1943).
124. United States v. Passavant, 169 U.S. 16 (1898).
125. 113 F. at 148.
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The Downs decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court.126 It
appears that the bestowal of a bounty or grant permitted the
dumping of the product. As explained by the Supreme Court:
In the case of Russian sugar the effect of the import
duties is much enhanced by the fact that, the supply of free
sugar from the home market being limited, the selling price
is very remunerative, and each producer has therefore an
interest in placing as much sugar as he can on the home
market; and as the total amount of free sugar is distributed
among all the manufactories in proportion to their entire
production, it may become to their interest to export their
surplus even at a loss, if such loss can be compensated by the
profits on sugar sold in the home market.'27
After reviewing the Russian sugar arrangement, the Supreme
Court stated that the bounty was at first one upon production
but that:
When a tax is imposed upon all sugar produced, but is
remitted upon all sugar exported, then, by whatever process,
or in whatever manner, or under whatever name it is dis-
guised, it is a bounty upon exportation. 2 "
The Court in Nicholas v. United States'29 examined the
Tariff Act of 1913130 while dealing with certain payments by a
foreign government to distillers of spirits who exported. The
Court examined the justification given for reimbursements to the
producers for certain costs. However, the Court stated:
If the word "bounty" has a limited sense the word
"grant" has not. A word of broader significance than "grant"
could not have been used. Like its synonyms "give" and
"bestow," it expresses a concession, the conferring of some-
thing by one person upon another. And if the "something"
be conferred by a country "upon the exportation of any
126. Downs v. United States, 187 U.S. 496 (1903).
127. Id. at 513.
128. Id. at 515.
129. 249 U.S. 34 (1919).
130. Paragraph E of Sec. 4 of the Tariff Act of 1913, 38 Stat. 114, 193-94.
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article or merchandise" a countervailing duty is required by
Paragraph E.'3 1
In that same year the United States Tariff Commission re-
ported:
For many years the tariff laws of the United States have
regularly provided for the imposition of countervailing duties
equal to the net amount of any grants or bounties allowed
by any foreign government in aid of the exportation of mer-
chandise to this country. The countervailing section of the
act of 1894 was enacted to restrict the dumping of sugar,
the production of which had been stimulated by Government
bounties. Formerly, therefore, the provision for such counter-
vailing duties was occasionally referred to as anti-dumping
legislation. Reflection will show, however, that these counter-
vailing duties possess that character in the United States
only in cases where they operate against the importation or
sale of articles in this country at less than their foreign
market value. Indeed, what is now known as dumping has,
in the main, grown from modem industrial conditions of pro-
duction and distribution, without reference to direct govern-
ment subsidies. It is a familiar development of the private
promotion of the foreign trade of many industrially advanced
countries.3 2
In the same report the Commission again addressed govern-
ment participation:
Broadly speaking, grants and bounties may or may not
result in dumping. They should be regarded as aids in that
direction rather than the practice itself. 133
131. 249 U.S. at 39. Countervailing duties were imposed (Treasury Decision [T.D.]
34466, May 25, 1914), and the latter decision was modified several times (T.D. 34992,
December 11, 1914; T.D. 47753, June 20, 1935; T.D. 52555, September 7, 1950; T.D.
55812, 28 Fed. Reg. 635, January 24, 1963). Finally, after further investigation it
was determined that bounties or grants were no longer being paid or bestowed upon
the exportation of spirits from Great Britain and that countervailing duties would no
longer he collected (after 63 years of collecting them); T.D. 77-65, 43 Fed. Reg.
9168, February 15, 1977.
132. U.S. TARIFF COMM'N, INFORMATION CONCERNING DUMPING AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA'S ANTI-DuMPING LAW at 10
(1919) [hereinafter, 1919 TARIFF COMM'N ANTIDUMPING REP.].
133. Id.
SECTION 337 JURISDICTION
In a separate report the Commission noted a number of un-
fair methods including countervailing duty violations.
It is pointed out that, in the field of unfair methods, this
country has various legislative enactments, including those
offsetting the effects of foreign grants and bounties through
countervailing duties, restricting the practice known as "full-
line forcing," and penalizing undervaluation in making entry
of imported goods. 34
The Secretary of the Treasury has wide latitude in many
areas involved in countervailing duty matters. For example, the
accuracy of the amount of countervailing duty is beyond the
province of court review.13 5
However, "once it has been determined that a bounty exists,
the Secretary has no discretion but to levy the appropriate
countervailing duty. See United States v. Hammond Lead
Products.'3
In Hammond Lead Products v. United States'8 7 the Court
in following the Nicholas case pointed out that the sole inquiry
"is whether the results of the governmental acts 'stimulate ex-
portation * * * by affording aid from the public treasury whereby
such goods may when exported be sold in competition with ours
for less'."-""
On appeal the CCPA in United States v. Hammond Lead
considered the jurisdictional issue stating it to be a novel ques-
tion "and a momentous one, fraught with consequences as to the
control of the executive branch over the foreign relations and
foreign policy of the United States"'139 and "that Section 303 is
penal in character."' 40
Treasury has declared that the bestowal of benefits granted
to an exporter from a foreign country to the United States con-
stitutes a bounty or grant but that unless they are more than
134. UNITED STATES TARIFF COMMISSION THIRD ANNUAL REPORT 11 (1919).
135. Energetic Worsted v. United States, 224 F. Supp. 606, 615 (Cust. Ct. 1963).
136. American Express v. United States, 472 F.2d 1050, 1056 (CCPA 1973).
137. Hammond Lead Products v. United States, 306 F. Supp. 460 (Cust. Ct. 1969).
138. Id. at 470.
139. United States v. Hammond Lead Products, supra note 119, at 1027.
140. Id. at 1028. The court made reference to indirect bounties and pointed out,
"The problem is with the undefined 'indirect bounty.' If it is direct, there is no
problem, but foreign governments with plans to subsidize their exports are rarely
that cooperative with the U.S. Treasury and courts." Id. at 1030.
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de minimis in relation to the quantity of exports involved, a
negative determination would be made.'41
Finally, one commentator has noted that the relation of the
antidumping to the countervailing duty statutes has apparently
been overlooked:
The antidumping and countervailing duty statutes
clearly have an interlocking conceptual basis and, indeed, the
practice of subsidizing exports has often been described as
"bounty dumping" in trade writings. Moreover, foreign anti-
dumping and countervailing duty measures are typically
combined into one law, and are frequently indistinguishable.
In the United States, however, the Antidumping Act
has traditionally been thought of strictly as a means of deal-
ing with the unfair trade practices of private interests,
whereas the countervailing duty law, despite its express in-
clusion of privately-sourced bounties, has in practice only
been applied as a remedy against official bounties....
... Since the application of countervailing duties is not
dependent upon a showing of injury, as is the application
of dumping duties, there would seem to be certain advantages
for an American businessman filing a complaint under sec-
tion 303 in such circumstances. Oddly enough, there is no
evidence that such an approach has ever been tried by domes-
tic producers.
V. HISTORY OF UNITED STATES
ANTIDUMPING LAW
Dumping has been defined as:
[D]umping is generally regarded as occurring whenever
there is a sale of imported merchandise at less than its pre-
vailing market or wholesale price in the country of pro-
duction. 48
141. Certain Consumer Electronic Products from Japan, 40 Fed. Reg. 5378,
February 5, 1975.
142. Feller, Mutiny Against the Bounty: An Examination of Subsidies, Border
Tax Adjustments, and the Resurgence of the Countervailing Duty Law, 1 LAW &
POL'Y IN INT'L BUS. 17, 33 (1969).
143. UNITED STATES TARIFF COMMISSION THIRD ANNUAL REPORT 11 (1919).
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More recently, a Congressional Committee staff critique gave
the following definition:
"Dumping," in a foreign trade sense, occurs when a
foreign producer sells his merchandise in this country at a
price less than that which he charges purchasers in his home
market, or a third country market, and a U.S. industry
suffers injury because of that price discrimination. 144
A. Present Antidumping Act, 1921, Proceedings
in the United States
According to the current Antidumping Act:
Whenever the Secretary of the Treasury... determines that
a class or kind of foreign merchandise is being, or, likely to
be, sold in the United States or elsewhere at less than its fair
value, he shall so advise the United States International
Trade Commission... and the Commission shall determine
within three months thereafter whether an industry in the
United States is being or is likely to be injured, or is pre-
vented from being established, by reason of the importation
of such merchandise into the United States. 145
The statute provides that when there have been findings of
sales at less than fair value and of injury or the likelihood thereof
to a domestic industry, "there shall be levied, collected, and paid,
in addition to any other duties imposed [upon the subject arti-
144. S. CoMm. ON FINANCE, THE ANTIDUMPING ACT OF 1921 AND THE INTER-
NATIONAL ANTIDUMPING CODE, CONSISTENT OR NOT? A critique by the Staff, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (July 5, 1968) [hereinafter, FINANCE COMM. STAFF CRITIQUE].
According to Viner, there are three types of dumping; (a) sporadic, (b) intermittent
and (c) persistent. VINER, DUMPING: A PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 3 (1923).
Ehrenhaft has stated that "[e]conomists are generally agreed that it is only the in-
termittent, predatory dumping of goods that is to be restrained." Ehrenhaft, Protec-
tion Against International Price Discrimination: United States Countervailing and
Antidumping Duties, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 44, 48 (1958). Kindleberger and Barcelo have
raised the problem of discerning the difference between predatory, intermittent and
persistent dumping on the grounds that they cannot be distinguished until after some
period of time has elapsed, but it has been argued by Viner that they can be dis-
tinguished by examining the average and marginal costs and only those goods sold for
export below the cost of production should be made the subject of antidumping duties.
KINDLEBERGFR, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS (1953); Barcelo, Antidumping Laws as
Barriers to Trade - The United States and the International Antidumping Code,
57 CORNELL L. REv. 491, 509 (1972); VINER, MEMORANDUM ON DUMPING (1926).
145. 19 U.S.C. § 160(a).
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cles] by law, a special dumping duty in an amount equal to such
difference."' 146 The margin is the amount by which the foreign
market value exceeds the purchase price or the exporter sales
price.
The Secretary shall, within thirty days of the receipt of the
information alleging that a particular class or kind of mer-
chandise is being or is likely to be sold in the United States
or elsewhere at less than its fair value and that an industry
in the United States is being or is likely to be injured, or
is prevented from being established, by reason of the im-
portation of such merchandise into the United States, deter-
mine whether to initiate an investigation into the question
of whether such merchandise in fact is being or is likely
to be sold in the United States or elsewhere at less than its
fair value. 147
If the Secretary's determination is affirmative, notice is pub-
lished in the Federal Register. If the Secretary's determination
is negative, the inquiry is closed.148
The Secretary makes an investigation into the dumping alle-
gations. Before making the LTFV149 determination, the Secre-
tary, if requested, shall conduct a hearing at which interested
persons have the right to appear. 50 Such hearings are specifically
exempted from the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).151
The Secretary then determines whether the subject merchandise
is being sold at LTFV. The determination is published in the
Federal Register, indicating whether it is affirmative or negative
"together with a complete statement of findings and conclusions,
and the reasons or basis therefor. ' ' 52
If an affirmative determination is made, the matter is referred
to the International Trade Commission, which has three months
within which to make a determination of whether there is injury
or likelihood of injury.153
146. 19 U.S.C. § 161 (a). The difference referred to here is also called the dump-
ing margin.
147. 19 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1).
148. 19 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1).
149. This term is used to mean "less than fair value" under the statute.
150. 19 U.S.C. § 160(d) (1).
151. 19 U.S.C. § 160(d) (3).
152. 19 U.S.C. § 160(d) (2).
153. 19 U.S.C. § 160(a).
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The Trade Act of 1974 provides for a summary procedure if
the Secretary determines that there is substantial doubt as to
whether an industry in the United States is being or likely to be
injured.5 4 Under this procedure, the reasons for doubt and a
preliminary indication concerning possible sales at LTFV are
forwarded to the Commission. Within 30 days after receipt of
this information from the Secretary, the Commission determines
whether there is reasonable indication that an industry in the
United States is being or is likely to be injured and advises the
Secretary of its determination.
The Secretary is provided with six months to make his deter-
mination, and if he is not able to do so within that time, he is
permitted to publish notice thereof together with the reasons
therefor. In this case he is allowed an additional three months.155
[T]he Secretary... shall, within six months after the pub-
lication under subsection (c) (1) . . . determine whether
there is reason to believe or suspect, from the invoice or
other papers or from information presented to him or to
any other person to whom authority under this section has
been delegated, that the purchase price is less, or that the
exporters sales price is less or likely to be less than the
foreign market value.
If the determination is affirmative, notice is published in the
Federal Register.'56
154. 19 U.S.C. § 160(c) (2).
155. 19 U.S.C. § 160(b) (2).
156. 19 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1). The other sections of the statute provide:
(1) Section 161 - special dumping duty.
(2) Section 162 - purchase price, relating to the price at which the
merchandise has been purchased or agreed to be purchased prior to the time
of exportation.
(3) Section 163 - regarding the price at which merchandise is sold or
agreed to be sold in the United States, the so-called exporter sale price.
(4) Section 164 - the foreign market value or price of merchandise or
similar merchandise sold or offered for sale in principal markets of the
exporting country.
(5) Section 165 - the constructed value, which are rules of constructing
the price under certain circumstances.
(6) Section 166 - definition of an exporter.
(7) Section 167 - oath and bond of the person for whose account mer-
chandise is imported before delivery thereof.
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The administration of the antidumping law is complex and
has many technical rules associated with it, including specific
methods for calculating whether or not there are sales at LTFV.
There are regulations 1 7 governing antidumping procedures.
Any person having information that merchandise is being or
likely to be imported into the United States under such circum-
stances which bring it within the purview of the Act, may com-
municate the information to the Commissioner of Customs.
A petition should include, as general information, the name
of the petitioner, the percentage of the total United States pro-
duction, sales and employment represented by the person filing,
and an indication of whether the applicant has filed for other
forms of import relief.15s There should be a detailed description
of the imported merchandise, including its technical characteris-
tics, its tariff classification, name of the country from which the
merchandise is being or likely to be imported, the name of the
foreign manufacturer, and the ports of probable importation into
the United States. 59 The petition should also contain price
information, such as the home market price in the country of
exportation or, if this is not available, the price from the country
of exportation to a third country. 6 ° Information concerning in-
jury to the domestic industry should also be included. 161
(8) Section 168 - appraisal and report to the collector of customs.
(9) Section 169 - appeals and protests from determinations of customs
officers.
(10) Section 170 - drawbacks, special duties treated as regular duties.
(11) Section 170a - definitions.
(12) Section 171 - indicating that sections 160 to 171 of Title 19 may be
cited as the "Antidumping Act, 1921."
(13) Section 172 - additional definitions.
157. See 19 C.F.R. Part 153 for Treasury regulations on antidumping, and 19
C.F.R. Part 208 for Commission regulations on antidumping.
158. 19 C.F.R. 153.27(a) (1).
159. 19 C.F.R. 153.27(a) (2).
160. 19 C.F.R. 153.27(a) (3).
161. 19 C.F.R. 153.27(a) (4), according to which the following information should
be included: domestic production, sales and prices over the most recent three year
period, and the profitability of the firms represented by the petitioner for the most
recent three year period, the capacity utilization of the firm, the volume and value of
import of the merchandise over the most recent three year period, the market share
of the alleged LTFV imports over the most recent three year period, the effect of
the alleged LTFV sales on domestic prices, unemployment of the firm and the entire
industry over the most recent three year period, capital investment by the firms
represented by the applicant over a five year period, the names and addresses of all
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B. Antidumping Legislation
There are two United States antidumping laws:
(1) Section 801 of the Tariff Act of 1916, also known as the
Antidumping Act of 1916, has been almost totally ignored.1'"2
The application of this statute requires in personam jurisdiction
over a dumping violator by a federal district court. Intent must
be proven and the difficulty of proving intent coupled with the
difficulty of obtaining in personam jurisdiction over foreign firms
are the reasons usually ascribed to the paucity in use of this
statute.
(2) Section 202 of the Tariff Act of 1921, also known as the
Antidumping Act, 1921,163 has been widely used. It is an in rem
proceeding and is presently administered by two governmental
agencies.'" While a showing of injury or likelihood thereof is
required, an intent to injure is not.
United States producers of competitive merchandise, and any other factors relevant
to possible injury or likelihood of injury to a domestic industry or prevention of
establishment of a domestic industry such as domestic demand and supply conditions,
number of domestic competitors and new entrants in the market, domestic prior
activity, export performance and increase foreign capacity.
162. Codified as 15 U.S.C. § 72. Approximately a decade prior to the passage of
the 1916 Antidumping Act, a classic case of dumping occurred by a U.S. firm in Europe.
The classic example envisions a monopolist at home which can use its excessive profits
to subsidize very low prices in another country to destroy competition there. A U.S.
government study, apparently printed in 1909, made findings that the Standard Oil
Company in 1904 and 1905 encountered more active competition in Europe than had
existed for some time before, and
it was the desire to destroy [this competition] or force them into agreements
favorable to the Standard, that led the Standard to adopt its policy of extreme
price cutting. . . . [The American people] can not be expected, however to
approve a condition under which, while the Standard is selling an enormous
volume of oil there at little or no profit, it is yet able to secure immense profits
on its total business through the extortionate prices in the home market.
REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF CORPORATIONS ON THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY, 1909,
Part III, Foreign Trade Reprint Edition, 1976, Arno Press Inc., at 91-92.
163. Codified as 19 U.S.C. § 161. This is the statute usually meant when the term
"Antidumping Act" is used.
164. The Secretary of the Treasury determines whether there have been sales at
less than fair value and the U.S. International Trade Commission determines whether
there has been injury to a domestic industry.
As long as Congress by a legislative act provides an intelligible principle to
which a government official is directed to conform, such a statute is not a forbidden
delegation of legislative power. Hampton v. United States, 276 U.S. 394.
The CCPA found the Antidumping Act, 1921, constitutional in Kleberg v.
United States, 71 F.2d 332 (CCPA 1933). The court also stated that "if the Secre-
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1. 1916 Antidumping Act
The Tariff Act of 1916 included the first U.S. antidumping
law which provides for both penal and civil sanctions in the federal
district courts, and even provides for treble damages.
It shall be unlawful for any person importing... any
articles from any foreign country into the United States...
to import, [or] sell.., such articles within the United States
at a price substantially less than the actual market value
tary of the Treasury has proceeded in the method prescribed by the Congress, we
may not judicially inquire into the correctness of his conclusions." Id. at 335.
The federal district courts have no jurisdiction over an action to enjoin the
Collector of Customs from assessing a special dumping duty. Cottman v. Dailey,
94 F.2d 85 (4th Cir. 1938). The reason for this is stated to be that Congress has
provided for appeals for importers dissatisfied with appraisals (19 U.S.C. § 381
(1501), appeal to Customs Court) and subsequent review by the CCPA (28 U.S.C.
§ 310 (2601)). The court cited with approval Riccimini v. United States, 69 F.2d
480, 484 (9th Cir. 1934) :
This system of corrective justice being complete in itself, it must be concluded
that Congress did not intend to allow any other method to redress supposed
wrongs occurring in the operation of the laws in relation to the collection of
[customs] revenues.
An action filed in federal district court to stay a pending dumping proceeding
was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because tariff litigation has been exclusively
conferred on the Customs Court. Horton v. Humphrey, 146 F. Supp. 819 (D.D.C.),
aff'd per curiam, 352 U.S. 921 (1956).
However, cases may arise where a district court may properly enjoin acts
by the Secretary of the Treasury when he is threatening action beyond the scope of
his authority which may result in irreparable injury to a complainant. Cottman v.
Dailey, 94 F.2d 85, 89; cf. Waite v. Macy, 246 U.S. 606 (1918) ; Miller v. Standard
Nut Margarine, 284 U.S. 498 (1932).
According to the Customs Court, Appellate Term, the rule making provisions
of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) apply to dumping proceedings (before
Treasury) but the CCPA did not consider this point on appeal. United States v. Elof
Hansson, 178 F. Supp. 922 (Cust. Ct.), rev'd on other grounds, 296 F.2d 779 (CCPA),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 899 (1961).
In Imbert Imports v. United States, 314 F. Supp. 784 (Cust. Ct. 1970), aff'd,
331 F. Supp. 1400 (App. Term Cust. Ct. 1971), the Customs Court said the APA
does not apply to dumping proceedings at the Commission. On review, the Appellate
Term referred to its previous holding in Elof Hansson that the APA did apply to
dumping proceedings and then affirmed without need to resort to specifically addressing
the issue.
While Treasury was considering whether there were sales at LTFV of
television sets, an importer sought to enjoin further proceedings by filing an action
in federal district court. The court found "the matter is exclusively within the
jurisdiction of the Customs Court" and that the district court did not have jurisdic-
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or wholesale price of such articles, at the time of exportation
to the United States, in the principal markets of the country
of their production, or of other foreign countries to which
they are commonly exported... [if such] acts be done with
the intent of destroying or injuring an industry in the United
States, or of preventing the establishment of an industry in
the United States, or of restraining or monopolizing any part
of trade and commerce in such articles in the United States. 165
This statute has apparently never had its sanctions imposed,
either by private parties under the treble damage provision or
the government under the penal provisions. Many commentators
have referred to the difficulty of enforcing the 1916 Act because
of the necessity of proving intent, and this is believed by these
commentators to be the reason for passage of the 1921 Act.165
There has been very little activity under this 1916 Act.'67
2. 1921 Antidumping Act
In the Tariff Act of 1921 another antidumping statute was
enacted;'68 it provides for enforcement by the Department of
the Treasury, both as to sales at less than fair value (LTFV)
and injury to a domestic industry. All antidumping proceedings
in the United States have proceeded under this statute. The
Antidumping Act requires action against dumped goods which
tion. J. C. Penney v. United States, 319 F. Supp. 1023 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 439
F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1971).
The CCPA has stated the courts have limited power of review over the
Commission's dumping determinations. City Lumber Co. v. United States, 457 F.2d
991 (CCPA 1972).
In a dumping proceeding involving television sets, and there had been find-
ings of sales at LTFV and injury, but no dumping duties had been levied, the CCPA
affirmed the Customs Court holding of lack of jurisdiction. Matsushita Elec. Ind. Co.
v. United States, 67 Cust. Ct. 328 (1971), aff'd, 485 F.2d 1402 (CCPA 1973).
165. 15 U.S.C. § 72. The last portion of this statute regarding injury reads
similarly to the injury portion of 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) and the pricing portion reads
similarly to that of the antidumping statute.
166. Ehrenhaft, supra note 144; Barcelo, supra note 144; Fisher, The Antidumping
Law of the United States: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 5 LAw & POL'Y IN
INT'L Bus. 85 (1973).
167. One case was decided on procedural issues, Wagner & Adler v. Mali, 74 F.2d
666 (2d Cir. 1935). Another case is New Jersey Union Elec. Corp. v. Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co., Civil No. 1706-70 (D.N.J. filed December 21, 1970).
168. Codified as 19 U.S.C. § 160.
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cause injury to a United States industry. There is no require-
ment of predatory intent and there are no "excuse" provisions
or exceptions as are provided in the Robinson-Patman Act.
In reviewing the legislative history the Customs Court in
City Lumber v. United States 69 states:
[T]he court cannot agree with appellants' limited or re-
stricted interpretation of the Antidumping Act. The act was
drawn in broad terms and its purpose was clearly to protect
a domestic industry from "dumping."
[I]t is well to remember that the 1921 Antidumping Act, as
passed by the House of Representatives, would have assessed
special dumping duties against any kind of dumping in com-
petition with a domestic industry without requiring a deter-
mination of injury. The injury requirement was incorpo-
rated into the bill by the Senate Finance Committee, but,
as pointed out in that Committee's report, the purpose was
to facilitate administration of the law, and not to restrict its
operation. See Senate Report 16, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. p. 10.
The House conferees agreed to the amendment, and the act
was thus passed with the injury determination requirement.
3. GATT
In 1947 GATT was signed. It permitted the signatories to
protect domestic industries from dumping violations. Article VI
states:
1. The contracting parties recognize that dumping, by
which products of one country are introduced into the com-
merce of another country at less than the normal value of
the products, is to be condemned if it causes or threatens
material injury to an established industry in the territory
of a contracting party or materially retards the establishment
of a domestic industry....
2. In order to offset or prevent dumping, a contracting
party may levy on any dumped product an anti-dumping
duty not greater in amount than the margin of dumping in
respect of such product.170
169. City Lumber Co. v. United States, 311 F. Supp. 340, 347-48 (Cust. Ct. 1970).
170. GATT, art. VI, 11 1, 2 (October 30, 1947), 61 Stat. pt. 5, at A 11, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 (1950).
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Since the U.S. Antidumping Act preexisted GATT, the
United States takes the position that by a grandfather clause,
U.S. law need not conform to GATT article VI.
4. 1954 Customs Simplification Act
In 1954 under the provisions of the Customs Simplification
Act, the injury determination phase was transferred to the U.S.
International Trade Commission 171 and has remained there since.
5. International Dumping Code
In 1967, the International Dumping Code172 was developed
and most of the GATT Contracting Parties signed, including the
United States. However, the United States did not provide legis-
lation to implement this Code and Congress made it clear that
the laws of the United States take precedence over the Code.
This situation remains today even in view of the Trade Act of
1974,173 which amended the United States Antidumping Act.
The Code requires "material" injury, but the United States
Antidumping Act only requires a determination of injury or likeli-
hood of injury.
171. Known at that time as the Tariff Commission.
172. Negotiated during the Kennedy Round at Geneva. T.I.A.S. 6431, 19 U.S.T.
4348, see 82 Stat. 1347.
For more information concerning the U.S. Antidumping Act, GATT Article
VI and the Code, see Study No. 2 - GA TT Provisions on Unfair Trade Practices,
EXECUTIVE BRANCH GATT STUDIES, Senate Finance Committee Print, March 1974
at 25-27.
The Code contains provisions concerning:
(1) Domestic industry, which is defined as domestic producers of "like
products," the latter being those which are identical with, or have charac-
teristics closely resembling those of the dumped product.
(2) An industry, which can be a competitive market area which is less
than the entire country under certain circumstances, but then must have
injury to almost all of production in the market area.
(3) Injury, which is to be material injury to a domestic industry.
(4) Causation, which is to be that the dumped merchandise is demon-
strably the principal cause or threat of material injury and dumping to be
weighed together with other factors adversely affecting the industry.
(5) Simultaneously there is to 'be the injury and the sales at LTFV con-
sideration and at least considered at time of determining whether or not to
initiate an investigation.
(6) Price assurances by the importer should allow termination. (FINANCE
COMM. STAFF CRITIQUE, supra note 144, at 4-8).
173. 88 Stat. 1978.
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The Code requires that dumped imports demonstrably be
the principal cause of material injury while the Antidumping
Act states only that injury by reason of dumped imports con-
stitutes a violation.
The Code requires that evidence of injury and dumping be
considered simultaneously in considering whether or not to ini-
tiate an investigation, and Treasury regulations require allega-
tions of injury as well as dumping.
When the Code was signed, the Senate requested comments
from the Commission. The Commission sent its report to the
Senate Finance Committee early in 1968.74
In the Commission report, the majority 175 stated:
It is well settled that the Constitution does not vest in
the President plenary power to alter domestic law. The Code,
no matter what are the obligations undertaken by the United
States thereunder internationally, cannot, standing alone
without legislative implementation, alter the provisions of
the Antidumping Act or of other United States statutes.
As matters presently stand, we believe that the jurisdiction
and authority of the Commission to act with respect to
dumping of imported articles is derived wholly from the
Antidumping Act, and 19 U.S.C. 1337.176
Since the Code would only permit the assessment of
special dumping duties as a deterrent to price discriminations
in international trade, the question arises as to whether other
remedies and penalties provided for in the unfair trade stat-
utes of the United States must be changed if there is to be
a conformity with the Code.1
174. TARIFF COMMISSION REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL DUMPING CODE (1968)
[hereinafter, TARIFF COMM'N REP. ON CODE]. Report dated March 13, 1968. This
report was requested by asking the Commission to comment on Senate Concurrent
Resolution 38, which was introduced to express the sense of Congress that, to the
extent the Code was inconsistent with the Antidumping Act, the Code should be
submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent and should not become effective
in this country until Congress enacts legislation for its implementation. Congress'
action was to enact the Renegotiation Amendments Act of 1968, as to which see
supra note 180 and accompanying text.
175. There was a Tariff Commission 3-2 Commissioner split on the report. The
majority included Vice Chairman Sutton, and Commissioners Culliton and Clubb.
176. TARIFF COMM'N REP. ON CODE, supra note 174, at 32-33.
177. Id. at 28.
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Dumping, which is a particular unfair trade practice
also known as price discrimination, is condemned in the
United States, both in interstate and international trade.
The Antidumping Act, 1921, as amended, is only one of
several acts of the United States Congress which deal with
price discrimination in international trade.'
7 8
In discussing U.S. laws on price discrimination, the Commis-
sion said:
Price discrimination in its various forms in international
trade would appear to be subject to one or more of the provi-
sions of at least six Federal statutes.179
And one of the six Federal statutes mentioned was section 337.
In certain areas the Code is not fully consistent with and
may conflict with the U.S. Antidumping Act, 1921. Under the
Renegotiation Amendments Act of 1968,180 Congress instructed
Treasury and the Commission to "resolve any conflict between
the International Antidumping Code and the Antidumping Act,
1921, in favor of the Act as applied by the agency administering
the Act." Thus the 1968 legislation permits application of the
Code only to the extent it does not conflict with domestic law or
limit the discretion of the Commission in making injury deter-
minations.
Concerning the agreement to implement article VI of the
GATT:
As a signatory to this agreement, the United States sub-
scribed to the International Antidumping Code on the con-
dition that the code would be applied only to the extent
that it did not conflict with domestic law or limit the dis-
cretion of the... Commission... in making injury deter-
minations.18 1
6. 1968 Amendments
The Antidumping Act, 1921, was amended in 1968 to coun-
teract the effect of Cottmann v. United States,8 2 which held that
178. Id. at 2.
179. Id. at 3.
180. Pub. L. 90-634, 82 Stat. 1347.
181. OPERATION OF THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM, 27th Rep. USITC Pub.
791 (1975), at 62 n.1.
182. 20 C.C.P.A. (Cust.) 344, cert. denied, 289 U.S. 750 (1932).
THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW JOURNAL
restricted sales in the home market did not qualify as (in the
language of the statute at that time) "freely offered for sale to
all purchasers." In view of the fact that foreigners had become
sufficiently sophisticated to avoid dumping problems by restrict-
ing sales in their home markets, Treasury requested changes in
the act.13
7. The Trade Act of 1974
The Senate Finance Committee Report on the Trade Act of
1974 expressed a desire for more vigorous enforcement of unfair
foreign trade practice statutes including "injurious price dis-
crimination" covered by the Antidumping Act, 1921. The amend-
ments were stated to be made to continue and improve effective
and vigorous enforcement of "this anti-price discrimination
statute."
Section 205 of the Antidumping Act, 1921, 14 was amended
by adding a section providing that (1) when sales in the home
country were made at less than the cost of production and (2)
continued over an extended period of time and (3) in substantial
quantities and (4) not at prices permitting recovery of all costs
within a reasonable period of time, such sales are to be disre-
garded. This amendment was added due to concern that "in the
absence of such a provision, sales uniformly made at less than cost
of production could escape the purview of the Act, and thereby
cause injury to United States industry with impunity."'1 5
The Committee did not define terms such as "technical
dumping, industry, injury, causation linkages" because it be-
lieved such matters "are adequately treated under existing prac-
tices and are best left to individual case determinations without
additional statutory guidelines."'86 The Antidumping Act, 1921,
is not a protectionist statute but is intended "to free U.S. imports
from unfair price discrimination practices." The Committee re-
fers to injury "indicators as suppression or depression of prices,
loss of customers, and penetration of the U.S. market."'187
183. Antidumping, Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Finance on H.R. 6006,
85th Cong., 2d Sess. 22-44 (March 26 and 27, 1968). These amendments also require
the Department of the Treasury and the Commission to publish notices of their
investigations.
184. 19 U.S.C. § 164.
185. FINANCE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 18, at 173.
186. Id. at 179.
187. Id.
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C. Dumping
As early at 1919 the Commission distinguished dumping in
the statutory sense (Antidumping Act, 1921) from other price-
related unfair competition:
Dumping may be comprehensively described as the sale
of imported merchandise at less than its prevailing market
or wholesale price in the country of production. The defini-
tion derives particular importance from a not infrequent
tendency to confuse with dumping ordinary low-price sales,
price cutting and severe competition of a legitimate sort, as
well as certain other trade practices which are generally
considered unfairly competitive."'
Broadly speaking, grants and bounties may or may not
result in dumping. They should be regarded as aids in that
direction rather than the practice itself.8 9
This report distinguishes dumping investigations from other
unfair competition proceedings (section 337) when it states that
"the deceptive use of trade-marks, deceptive imitation of goods,
false labeling, exploitation of patents, deceptive advertising and
commercial threats and bribery" are different from dumping and
"distinguishable phases of unfair competition require divergent
legislative treatment from that which is indicated if the conse-
quences of dumping are to be avoided."'190
Ordinary price cutting and underselling are so universal,
both in domestic and foreign fields, that it is taken for
granted that restrictions are contemplated only when their
practice is accompanied by unfair circumstances or by un-
fortunate public consequences.''
The place of intent in statutory dumping proceedings is stated
to be as follows:
It should also be observed that economic conditions are
more significant in the development of dumping practices
188. 1919 TARIFF COMm'N ANTIDUMPING REP., supra note 132, at 9.
189. Id. at 10.
190. Id. at 11.
191. Id. at 18.
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than is any particular intent.... In dumping, the intent to
injure, destroy or prevent the establishment of an industry,
or to restrain or monopolize trade or commerce in the United
States, is not necessarily present.192
The Tariff Commission reviewed the 1916 Antidumping Act
and criticized it for uncertainty in requiring sales in the United
States at a price "substantially less" than the actual market value
or wholesale price abroad, and in applying its penalties "only to
persons who 'commonly and systematically import' foreign arti-
cles"'193 thus making it inapplicable to sporadic dumping; it
further criticized the requirement that there must be the intent
to injure, destroy, or prevent the establishment of an industry
in this country, or to monopolize trade or commerce in the im-
ported articles.
An "industry" under the Antidumping Act, 1921, may be
comprised of producers in one geographical region and need not
include all domestic producers. 14 While a dumping proceeding
was pending concerning cast-iron soil pipe imported from the
United Kingdom, an action was filed in federal district court by
certain importers requesting a stay of proceedings. That action
was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because tariff litigation has
been exclusively conferred on the Customs Court.195
The court in Orlowitz said that the meaning of "industry"
was not clear and therefore examined legislative intent. It noted
that in 1954 the Finance Committee, in reporting on the Customs
Simplification Act, said
The Committee believes, for example, that it should be
clear that injury in a particular geographical area may be
sufficient for a finding of injury under the Anti-Dumping Act.
For a short period of time, the Commission had used an anti-
trust reading of the Antidumping Act, 1921, by stating that sales
at LTFV are condemned only when there is an anticompetitive
192. Id. at 20.
193. In reading the statute it will be seen that more than common and systematic
importing is required - such importing must be at prices substantially less than actual
market value in the country of production.
194. Ellis K. Orlowitz Co. v. United States, 200 F. Supp. 302 (Cust. Ct. 1961).
195. Horton v. Humphrey, 146 F. Supp. 819 (D.D.C.), motion to afirm granted,
352 U.S. 921 (1956).
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effect and only then can such sales be equated with the concept
of "unfair competition."'196
The City Lumber case was appealed to the CCPA,197 and in
its affirmance, the court states its view that
intent is a perfectly legitimate matter for the Commission
to take into consideration. The statute refers not only to
injury but also to likelihood of injury, which clearly envisages
future events and the probability of their occurrence accord-
ing to someone's intent.198
One commentator has noted:
There is a real economic distinction between the use of
dumping as a predatory pricing practice to injure U.S. com-
panies, and as a reaction by the foreign producer to meet
the prevailing U.S. price or to go slightly under the U.S.
price to gain a foothold. The predatory dumping action more
closely resembles the practice feared at the time of the en-
actment of both antidumping laws; that is, a foreign pro-
ducer's decision to charge a high, cartel price in the home
market, and dump any excess capacity in other markets on
an incremental or subsidized pricing basis. The Commission
has focused on the impact of the practice on the U.S. in-
dustry; it has generally not considered the distinction, made
by many commentators, between predatory and more benign
forms of dumping. 19
In questioning the need for antidumping legislation, that
commentator also notes:
Further, before discarding the antidumping mechanism,
serious consideration should be given to the need for an
agency possessing special expertise, like the International
196. Titanium Dioxide from France, Inv. No. AA 1921-31, 1963 - no injury;
Titanium Dioxide from West Germany, Inv. No. AA 1921-46, 1966 - no injury;
White Portland Cement from Japan, Inv. No. AA 1921-38, 1964 - no injury; Chromic
Acid from Australia, Inv. No. AA 1921-32, 1964 - injury; Vital Wheat Gluten
from Canada, Inv. No. AA 1921-37, 1964 - no injury.
197. City Lumber Co. v. United States, 457 F.2d 991 (CCPA, 1972).
198. Id. at 997.
199. Applebaum, The Antidumping Laws - Impact on The Competitive Process,
43 ABA ANTITRUST L.J. 590, 600-01 (1974).
THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW JouRNAL
Trade Commission, to deal with unfair trade practice by
importers.2 0 0
Another noted commentator has questioned whether there
is any need at all for an antidumping law:
Any careful consideration of antidumping laws inevita-
bly raises doubts about the need for such legislation at all,
especially in a developed country like the United States,
with its bulging armory of antitrust laws. It seems fair to
say that dumping has not proved to be the threat anticipated
at the turn of the century or during the interwar years. The
Robinson-Patman and Sherman Acts in particular give ample
protection against predatory practices, even in incipient
stages, and there seems little reason from a free trade per-
spective to demand greater protection or different standards
where international as opposed to domestic price discrimina-
tion is at issue. Both of these antitrust laws may be enforced
against local importers or nonresident foreigners.20'
VI. PREDATORY PRICING
Predatory pricing is usually defined as low pricing which does
not result from legitimate purposes and with the intent of injuring
or destroying a competitor. °2
Ruinous competition by lowering prices has been recog-
nized as an illegal medium of eliminating weaker compe-
titors. 2 0 3
Such price-cutting to capture the market, by eliminating
the appellee therefrom, is prohibited by the provisions of the
Clayton Act. It was foreign to any legitimate commercial
competition. °4
200. Id. at 605.
201. Barcelo, supra note 144.
202. Porto Rican American Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 30 F.2d 234,
237 (2d Cir. 1929), rendered under Section 2 of the Clayton Act.
203. Id. at 236.
204. Id. at 237.
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The Robinson-Patman Act provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce,
in the course of such commerce... to sell, or contract to
sell, goods ... at unreasonably low prices for the purpose of
destroying competition or eliminating a competitor.
205
The Robinson-Patman Act usually brings to mind price dis-
crimination; but, as can be seen from the above-quoted portion
of section 3 thereof, unreasonably low prices are also covered by
this statute. One portion of this statute prohibits, as does the
original Clayton Act, charging predatorily low prices in one geo-
graphic area while maintaining higher prices in another.
Determinations of whether or not there is predatory pricing
frequently involve two areas to be examined in each instance:
(1) Are the prices charged (a) below cost, or (b) less than
is being charged in another geographic area or another country,
and
(2) Is the unreasonably low price being charged with the
intent of injuring or destroying a competitor.
As to issue (1) (a), whether or not sales are being made
below cost, an economic analysis need be made for such a deter-
mination. The results may vary depending upon the particular
system of accounting used. Furthermore, there is a variety of
meanings which may be given to the term "costs" in "sales below
costs." For example, a below-cost price may mean to one econo-
mist "a price that fails to cover short-run average total cost (as
reflected in accounting data), a definition that of course produces
a much higher figure than either short-run marginal cost or
average variable cost." 0 6
Predatory, below-cost, selling could mean that a firm is not
maximizing short-run profits. The profit-maximizing output "is
that where any increase in output would add more to costs than
to revenues and any decrease in output would reduce revenues
more than costs.... However, not all deliberate sacrificing of
short-run profits is illegitimate." According to this theory, a firm
with market control should be presumed to have engaged in a
205. 15 U.S.C. § 13a, Section 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act. But see note 89,
supra, and accompanying text.
206. Koller, The Myth of Predatory Pricing: An Empirical Study, 4 ANTITRUST
L. EcoN. REv. 105, 106 (Summer 1971) [hereinafter, Koller].
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predatory practice when it prices below its marginal cost or below
its average variable cost.20 7
The determination of whether there are different prices in
different areas is usually much simpler. However, complications
can arise when the need occurs to take transportation into con-
sideration. The determination becomes even more complex when
the two geographic areas are located in two different countries
with different duty rates. These considerations are similar to
LTFV determinations which the Department of the Treasury
makes in antidumping proceedings when comparing the price on
the U.S. market with that in the home country or in another
foreign market.
A further difficult issue is whether the particular pricing
under consideration has been engaged in for the purpose of in-
juring or destroying a competitor. This will almost never be
provable by direct evidence and will usually require the use of
inferences. For example, if there appears to be no logical legiti-
mate reason for the particularly low price, an illegal purpose may
be inferred, and the burden of explaining away this inference rests
with the party charged with predatory pricing.
In considering predatory pricing, it should be noted that
"[a]ntitrust legislation is concerned primarily with the health of
the competitive process, not with the individual competitor who
must sink or swim in competitive enterprise." Anheuser-Busch
v. Federal Trade Commission,0 " citing with approval Atlas Build-
ing Products Co. v. Diamond Block and Gravel Co.,20 9 and
Whitaker Cable Corporation v. Federal Trade Commission.210 This
is an important point for inevitably "[c] ompetition... is a battle
for something that only one can get; one competitor must neces-
sarily lose,"'211 and this is because "competition is, in its very
essence, a contest for trade, '' 21 2 and therefore the Robinson-
207. Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2
of The Sherman Act, 88 HARv. L. REv. 697, 703-04, 712-13 (1975) [hereinafter,
Areeda & Turner].
208. 289 F.2d 835 (7th Cir. 1961).
209. 269 F.2d 950, 954 (10th Cir. 1959).
210. 239 F.2d 253 (7th Cir. 1956).
211. Sinclair Refining Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 276 F. 686, 688 (7th Cir.
1921), aff'd, 261 U.S. 463 (1922).
212. United States v. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, 47 F.2d 288, 297 (E.D.
Mo. 1931).
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Patman Act (section 2 (a)) ".... is not concerned with mere shifts
of business between competitors. 213
Under the price discrimination portion of the Act (section
2 (a)), the discrimination need not have had an actual adverse
effect on competition since it is enough that it "may" have the
proscribed effect, meaning a probability thereof.
214
[A] well-grounded finding of substantial actual present in-
jury might with other facts be a basis for a finding of a
reasonable probability or possibility of future adverse
effect .... 215
Predatory pricing theory assumes that present lost profits
will be more than compensated for after the competitor is elimi-
nated and the monopolist has more freedom to set pricing without
the interference of the competitive process or that the present
lost profits in one market are compensated for in another market
where the alleged violator has greater market control.
However, in recent years this theory has come under in-
creasing attack.216 The Robinson-Patman Act has been indicated
to be intended to catch price discrimination and predatory pric-
.ing at an early stage:
The statute is designed to reach such discriminations "in
their incipiency," before the harm to competition is effected.
It is enough that they "may" have the prescribed effect.... 217
Section 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act is a criminal statute
:and is not an "antitrust law" within the meaning of the Clayton
Act and cannot be the basis of a civil action for private damages
or injunctive relief.218 However, since violations of this section
may have the effect or tendency of restraining or monopolizing
213. Anheuser-Busch v. FTC, 289 F.2d 835.
214. Corn Products Refining Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 324 U.S. 726 (1945).
215. Anheuser-Busch v. FTC, supra note 210, at 841.
216. Koller, supra note 206, Areeda & Turner, supra note 207.
217. Corn Products v. FTC, supra note 214, at 738.
218. Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Milk Co., 355 U.S. 373 (1958).
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trade, they nevertheless may serve as the basis for a section 337
violation.
If the price fixed by the defendants for the purchase of
machines sold by them is uniform, it may be lower than the
price charged by plaintiff for its machines, without subjecting
defendants to the charge of lessening competition, creating a
monopoly, or injuring or eliminating competition. But a
practice of underselling plaintiff in certain territory where
plaintiff has an established business and maintaining a higher
level of prices in other localities where competition with
plaintiff or other companies is not so keen is a practice con-
demned by the antitrust laws, and is a practice which may
permit a remedy to plaintiff if such practices are established
upon the trial of this cause, and a resulting damage to plain-
tiff is proved.21 9
In A.J. Goodman and Son v. United Lacquer Mfg. Corp.220
the Court held that a civil action complaint properly alleged a
violation of section 3, as a basis for which plaintiff was claiming
triple damages. A contract to sell at an unreasonably low price
was sufficient under section 3, as distinguished from other sections
which require actual sales.
In an early case it was held that while section 3 was penal
in nature, since it "attacks the problem of monopoly and obstruc-
tion of competition in interstate commerce, [it] is, therefore, an
'antitrust law' for violation of which civil remedies are given by
Title 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 15 and 26. '' 221 The court found that since
the plaintiff gas station owners were not engaged in interstate
commerce in their retail sales, they therefore were "not within
the purview of the Robinson-Patman Act. '' 222 The gas station
owners were found to have themselves been guilty of an antitrust
violation (price maintenance) and if they had been engaged in
interstate commerce they would be in violation of the Sherman
Act. The court said no relief should be granted to assist the
carrying out of an illegal agreement.
219. National Nut Co. v. Kelling Nut Co., 61 F. Supp. 76,81 (N.D. Ill. 1945).
220. 81 F. Supp. 890 (D. Mass. 1949).
221 Spencer v. Sun Oil Co., 94 F. Supp. 408, 410 (D. Conn. 1950).
222. Id. at 411.
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In finding the term "unreasonably low" prices free of un-
constitutional vagueness, the court pointed out that "[c]ost ac-
countancy has reached the exactness of a science." 223
The unreasonably low price which the statute considers an
evil would rarely, if ever, be an initial price, except in the
rare instance where it would relate to a product not pre-
viously marketed. In most instances, it would involve a sud-
den and unexpected change of price in a staple article of
commerce by one engaged in a competitive field.224
The court then lists new economic factors which might justify
a precipitate price decrease such as changes in the costs of produc-
tion and demand.
In Hershel California Fruit Products Co. v. Hunt Foods,225
where the primary relief requested was an injunction, the in-
junction was denied because plaintiffs did not show irreparable
harm. There was evidence of good faith lowering of prices. The
court discussed the difficulties in attempting to restore competi-
tion by use of injunctive relief.
In a private suit for treble damages, Moore v. Mead's Fine
Bread Co.,226 under section 3 it appeared defendant had cut its
intrastate local prices while maintaining its price in its interstate
sales. The court found the evidence to amply support a finding
that the local price cutting was intended to eliminate a com-
petitor.
The victim, to be sure, is only a local merchant; and no
interstate transactions are used to destroy him... .. The
profits made in interstate activities would underwrite the
losses of local price-cutting campaigns....
This type of price cutting was held to be "foreign to any
legitimate commercial competition" even prior to the Robin-
son-Patman Act. See Porto Rican American Tobacco Co. v.
American Tobaccco Co., 30 F.2d 234, 237...
It is, we think, clear that Congress by the Clayton Act
and Robinson-Patman Act barred the use of interstate busi-
ness to destroy local business, outlawing the price cutting
employed by respondent.22 7
223. F&A Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 98 F. Supp. 180 (S.D. Cal. 1951).
224. Id. at 189-90.
225. 111 F. Supp. 732 (N.D. Cal. 1953).
226. 348 U.S. 115 (1954).
227. Id. at 119-20.
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In an extremely competitive market where the number of
films in a locality was reduced to two and overall sales were still
decreasing, one firm reduced prices to increase volume and de-
crease unit cost and one firm initiated a treble damage action
where the only question was "whether uniform price reductions
violated the unreasonably low price provisions of section 3 of
the Robinson-Patman Act. ' 228 The court stated:
[O]ne who consistently sells at unreasonably low prices is
vulnerable to the inference that he is doing so for the pro-
scribed purpose of destroying competition or eliminating a
competitor.
We cannot say, however, that a pricing policy based upon
sound economics is inadmissible simply because it may result
in the destruction of a competitor, for it is not within the
scope or purpose of the antitrust laws to protect a business
against loss in a competitive market.... If, as the trial court
held, the price reductions on domestic coal were made to
increase volume and decrease unit cost in order to retain its
proportionate share of a diminishing market, the appellees
were certainly within the law. In the final analysis, the
question resolves itself into one of intent and purpose, not a
choice of accounting methods. (emphasis supplied) 229
In Nashville Mills Co. v. Carnation Co. 230 the Supreme Court,
for the first time, considered whether section 3 was one of the
antitrust laws, the violation of which could lead to private causes
of action, or whether it was strictly penal in nature. In a 5-4
decision the majority stated:
It is not an idle conjecture that the possibility of abuse
inherent in a private cause of action based upon this vague
provision was among the factors which led Congress to leave:
the enforcement of the provisions of § 3 solely in the hands
of the public authorities....
[W]e should not read the Robinson-Patman Act as sub-
jecting violations of the "unreasonably low prices" provision
of § 3 to the private remedies given by the Clayton Act.23 '
228. Ben Hur Coal Co. v. Wells, 242 F.2d 481, 483 (10th Cir. 1957).
229. Id. at 486.
230. 355 U.S. 373 (1958).
231. Id. at 378-79.
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And the Court held "that a private cause of action does not lie
for practices forbidden only by § 3 of the Robinson-Patman
Act."132 The dissent, however, points out:
As the [majority of the] Court notes, it appears that the
Department of Justice has never enforced the criminal pro-
visions of § 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act. Because of the
Court's holding that § 3 is not available in civil actions to
private parties, the statute has in effect been repealed. It
is apparent that the opponents of the Robinson-Patman Act
have eventually managed to achieve in this Court what they
could not do in Congress.2 33
In 1959 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Atlas Building
Products v. Diamond Block & Gravel234 said:
Antitrust legislation is concerned primarily with the
health of the competitive process, not with the individual
competitor who must sink or swim in competitive enterprise.
But as a necessary incident thereto, it is concerned with
predatory price cutting which has the effect of eliminating
or crippling a competitor. For surely there is no more effec-
tive means of lessening competition or creating monopolies
than the debilitation of a competitor.
And, as to the inferences of predatory prices in view of the acts
complained of, the Court said:
It is significant, we think, that the appellant was the
largest manufacturer and supplier of cinder concrete blocks
in this territory. It enjoyed a virtual monopoly in El Paso
County, and possessed the dominant market power in nearby
counties in New Mexico, including Dona Ana County. In
this setting, it is fairly inferable that the appellant utilized
its higher El Paso prices to stifle competition with its lower
prices in the Las Cruces area. In other words, that the
appellant utilized its dominant market power for predatory
ends.235
232. Id. at 382.
233. Id. at 387-88.
234. 269 F.2d 950, 954 (10th Cir. 1959).
235. Id. at 956.
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As to proof, the jury at the district court level had properly
been instructed that even though the pricing policy of the party
charged with illegal pricing was actionable at law, "the burden
was on the [charging party] to establish by a preponderance of
the evidence that the losses, if any, were proximately caused by
such price discriminations" 23 6 and not for other reasons. The
jury had been clearly instructed "that there must be a causal
connection between the losses sustained, if any, and the unlawful
acts."23 T
Many times one competitor charges another with illegal
pricing policies by arguing that the competitor sells at a price
lower than plaintiff's cost. That this is not a sufficient basis for
a holding of illegality is clear from Gold Fuel Service v. Esso
Standard Oil: 238
The appellant here has conceded that it has no evidence
of such intention except an inference it would draw from the
fact that [defendant's] ultimate bid was less than what it
would cost appellant and other middlemen to purchase and
deliver the commodity in question. This is not, in our view,
a permissible inference. If allowed, it would make every bid
lower than a competitor's cost a sufficient basis for a finding
of attempted monopoly.
Section 3 "was aimed at a specific weapon of the monopolist -
.predatory pricing" and is not unconstitutionally vague.2" Failure
to demonstrate causation will prevent recovery.24 °
In Utah Pie v. Continental Baking2' the Court said a party
could lower its price in view of below-cost pricing by a competi-
tor and still have the trier of fact consider "the potential impact
of [the competitor's] price reduction absent any responsive price
cut by [such party]."242
It is interesting that the Court (as the International Trade
Commission in certain cases) disagrees with the apparent view
of the court of appeals "that there is no reasonably possible
236. Id. at 957.
237. Id. at 958.
238. 306 F.2d 61, 64 (3d Cir. 1962).
239. United States v. National Dairy Products, 372 U.S. 29, 34 (1963).
240. Shore Gas & Oil v. Humble Oil & Refining, 224 F. Supp. 922 (D.N.J. 1963).
241. 386 U.S. 685 (1967).
242. Id. at 699.
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injury to competition as long as the volume of sales in a
particular market is expanding and at least some of the competi-
tors in the market continue to operate at a profit."24 3 And as to
the future, the statutory test is one that necessarily looks forward
on the basis of proven conduct in the past.24'
In one of the most significant decisions involving predatory
pricing, International Air Industries v. American Excelsior,'245
predatory pricing was defined:
By "predatory" we mean that AMXCO must have at
least sacrificed present revenues for the purpose of driving
Vebco out of the market with the hope of recouping the
losses through subsequent higher prices.246
In reviewing previous decisions the court said:
Judicial use of the term "predatory intent" is trouble-
some. Several cases hold that from a finding of certain
actions, the trier of fact may infer predatory intent, and from
this inference the proscribed inimical effects upon competi-
tion in turn may be inferred. However, application of these
principles is particularly difficult, for predatory intent has
never been clearly defined. Its appearance has been charac-
terized by phrases such as "putting a crimp" into one's com-
petitors, punitively or destructively attacking other firms,
and acting vindictively with punitive effect. But any price
decrease by a legitimately competitive firm will necessarily
have a nonremunerative effect upon other firms in the market,
if only by decreasing their profit margins. It is therefore
important to clearly indicate the types of business behavior
which violate the Act. 47
The court then cited with approval and discussed the position of
certain commentators. 24s However, a different view has also been
presented.2 49
243. Id. at 702.
244. Id. at 703.
245. 517 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1975).
246. Id. at 723.
247. Id. at 722-23.
248. Areeda & Turner, supra note 207.
249. Scherer, Predatory Pricing and The Sherman Act: A Comment, 89 H.Av.
L. REv. 869 (1976). This article is commented upon: Areeda & Turner, Scherer On
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The U.S. Department of Justice has expressed doubt about
the effectiveness of the Robinson-Patman Act in accomplishing
its intended results:
Recent empirical studies, however, have shown that
genuine predation, i.e., pricing below shortrun marginal costs,
is rare. Moreover, such predation which can actually threaten
competition and consumer well-being does not require the
Robinson-Patman Act for prevention since it can be reached
independently under the Sherman Act.250
VII. ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONSHIP OF COUNTERVAILING
DUTIES AND ANTDUMPING LAW To COMMISSION'S
SECTION 337 JURISDICTION
The ultimate problem is for the Commission - and eventu-
ally the courts - to decide the extent of Commission jurisdiction
in the area.
A. GENERAL
An examination of the statute disclose three portions which
are pertinent to the jurisdiction problem:
(1) "when found by the Commission to exist shall be dealt
with, in addition to any other provisions of law."'25 '
(2) "there shall be excluded any period of time during which
such investigation is suspended because of proceedings in a court
or agency of the United States involving similar questions con-
cerning the subject matter of such investigation. '252
(3) "Whenever, in the course of an investigation under this
section, the Commission has reason to believe, based on infor-
mation before it, that the matter may come within the purview of
section 1303 or of the Antidumping Act, 1921, it shall promptly
notify the Secretary of the Treasury so that such action may be
taken as is otherwise authorized by such section and such Act. '253
Predatory Pricing: A Reply, 89 HARv. L. REv. 891 (1976), and this is responded to:
Scherer, Some Last Words On Predatory Pricing, 89 HARv. L. REV. 901 (1976).
250. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE REPORT ON THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT,
1976, at 164-65.
251. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (a).
252. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b) (1).
253. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b) (3).
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Whether or not one finds these three portions of the statute
clear and not in conflict, it must be recalled that portion 1 was
already part of the statute prior to the amendments effected by
the Trade Act of 1974, but that portions 2 and 3 were added.
Portion 1 had previously, and for a long period, been interpreted
by the Commission as not requiring it to conduct an investigation
when the allegations could be dealt with by the courts or another
agency.254
The CCPA has recently 255 stated:
Long-established administrative practice may bear on
the construction of the tariff laws . . . However, this court
has recognized such practice to be comparable to other ex-
trinsic aids to ascertaining legislative intent which come into
play when the construction of a statutory provision is in
doubt.2 56
When Congress reenacted portion 1 it incorporated the Com-
mission's construction. The CCPA in Commonwealth Oil cites
with approval C.J. Tower & Sons v. United States2 57 and states
that there:
[T] he court also recognized the reenactment of an ambiguous
statute without substantive change to have incorporated the
administrative construction where that construction had been
followed consistently for a long time.258
The addition of portions 2 and 3 would seem to allow for a
contruction consistent with past Commission practice. It there-
fore seems that the pertinent portions of the statute are not
clear and, as the CCPA has said, "the statutory provisions at
issue are ambiguous as to the intended scope... [and] [r] esort
to extrinsic aids in ascertaining the legislative intent is therefore
warranted in this case. '259
254. See supra notes 21-50 and accompanying text.
255. Commonwealth Oil Refining v. United States, 480 F.2d 1352 (CCPA 1973).
256. Id. at 1361.
257. 44 CCPA (Cust.) 41, 44, C.A.D. 634 (1957).
258. Commonwealth Oil Refining v. United States, supra, 480 F.2d at 1361. The
Court also pointed out that "an administrative practice prejudicial to the importer
shown to be clearly erroneous would be reversible despite its age." Id. at 1361.
259. Id. "Although this language [of section 337(b)(3)] logically indicated a
Congressional intent for the Commission to refrain from investigating matters within
the purview of the antidumping and countervailing duty laws, it is not without some
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An examination of legislative intent shows that "[i]t is ex-
pected that the Commission's practice of not investigating matters
clearly within the purview of either section 303 or the Antidump-
ing Act will continue. 2
60
B. The Commission Alternatives
1. The Commission could refuse to exercise jurisdiction.
The Commission could refuse to exercise jurisdiction on the
basis that the recent amendments make it clear that Congress did
not wish to have agency duplicative proceedings, as voiced, for
example, in the Finance Committee Report which states the ex-
pectation that the Commission's practice of not investigating
matters clearly within the purview of either section 303 or the
Antidumping Act would be continued.2 6'
This action would be in accord with Commission action in the
Almond investigation, which was dismissed by the Commission
because
[t]he Commission has never considered dumping within the
meaning of the Antidumping Act of 1921 as constituting a
basis for action either under section 337 of the Tariff Act of
1930 or its antecedent provision section 316 of the Tariff
Act of 1922.262
It would also be in accord with a later case, Ceramic Wall
Tile, in which the complainant alleged violations of the antidump-
ing and antitrust laws. In dismission the complaint the Com-
mission stated that a section 337 investigation was not warranted
"unless the acts or practices complained of have been dealt with
under the antitrust laws or section 5 of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act and the relief afforded under these statutes has been
found wanting. 26 3
ambiguity. Therefore, resort may appropriately be had to the legislative history of
the amendment for clarification." Color TV Sets, supra note 9, letter of September
24, 1976 from William E. Simon, Secretary of the Treasury.
260. FINANCE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 18, at 195.
261. Id.
262. Almonds, supra note 30.
263. Ceramic Wall Tile, supra note 49. In Color TV Sets, supra note 9, the
Federal Trade Commission suggested the ITC dismiss the complaint:
We understand that the issue of continued exercise of jurisdiction over the
complaint is now before the ITC in the form of respondents' motion to dismiss.
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However, the difficulty with this position is that it emascu-
lates the statute, as has happened in the past. The reason for
the long period of inactivity under section 337 during the years
Insofar as the amended complaint relates to predatory pricing practices, whether
or not undertaken in concert or as a part of a conspiracy, we believe the alleged
unlawful activities fall within the purview of separate statutory procedures for
dealing with dumping activities or improper export incentives. We urge the ITC
to adhere to these procedures and notify the Department of the Treasury as
prescribed by Section 337(b) (3) of the amended Tariff Act. Moreover, in the
absence of specific allegations of conspiratorial activity going beyond predatory
pricing, we urge the ITC to consider the wisdom of continued exercise of juris-
diction over this matter, particularly where continued proceedings would unneces-
sarily compel Respondents to appear before two different agencies with respect
to the same issues. . . . In any event, the allegations in the subject proceedings
are directed against unfair acts which result in predatory prices. One remedy
which could deal with this problem would be the imposition of an additional
import duty to offset the unfair pricing practice - and such a remedy is available
to the Secretary of the Treasury under the Antidumping Countervailing Duty laws.
... . Therefore we respectfully urge that . . . the complaint be dismissed
insofar as complainants fail to allege any additional specific conspiratorial acts
within the jurisdiction of the ITC.
Id., letter of August 27, 1976, from Charles A. Tobin, Secretary, FTC.
The Department of Justice has taken the position in Color TV Sets that the
allegations dealing with receipt of economic benefits should be dismissed as a matter
of law and that the allegations of predatory pricing should be dismissed as a matter
of policy. As to receipt of economic benefits, the Justice Department believes enforce-
ment by Treasury Department to be the exclusive remedy.
Second, for the Commission to proceed here would lead to difficulties of in-
consistent dual enforcement. Complainants unsuccessful with Section 303 cases
at Treasury would have another opportunity to seek redress denied by the primary
enforcement agency, harassing adversaries and undermining a final resolution
of issues.
Id. As to dumping, the Justice Department stated:
There may be situations where a complainant can show conduct unrelated to pre-
dation or below-cost pricing. Such a pleading could raise issues of unfair com-
petition beyond the dumping issue which would make the complaint viable even
under Section 337(b) (3), but the amended complaint does not appear to be one
such. The Commission should be able to recognize the difference, early in a
proceeding, between true unfair competition allegations and ones which appear
to be nothing more than "lesser included offenses" which, in themselves, do not
even rise to the level of consummated dumping. ...
The investigation now being conducted by Treasury should be the exclusive
avenue for examination of below-cost or unreasonably low-cost pricing complaints
regarding Japanese television receivers outside of private litigation. ...
A second concern is the possibility that domestic firms faced with vigorous
foreign competition could, if the Commission permitted it, file simultaneous dump-
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1940-1968 is in large part explained by the Commission's willing-
ness to dismiss complaints whenever a concurrent case was pend-
ing in another agency, in the courts, or if action appeared to be
available in another forum and it had not yet been demonstrated
to the Commission that this other action was inadequate. (For
example, Ceramic Wall Tile.) It would appear from the Trade
Act of 1974 amending section 337 that Congress did not intend
that the Commission gradually sink back to its quiescent state
of virtual non-action,2 but rather that when unfair acts in con-
nection with imported goods are involved the Commission "shall"
ensure that appropriate action is quickly taken.
Furthermore, if the Commission were to take this position
now, it would be difficult to change to a different position in the
future. While the Commission has been free to change its posi-
tions in the past, in view of the type of court review of commission
actions now provided, the Commission must plan on contending
with stare decisis and the holdings of the courts when reviewing
agency decisions which tend to use previous agency decisions
over long periods of time as precedent.26 5
Therefore, it would appear that the first alternative (refusing
jurisdiction) would not be workable.
2. The Commission could refuse to take jurisdiction until
after Treasury has acted.
While this alternative would appear at first blush to be a
reasonably workable solution, it is difficult to reconcile taking
such action with congressional intent as expressed with passage
of the Trade Act of 1974, which clearly indicates that expeditious
action is to be taken by the Commission:
ing, countervailing duty, private actions, and 337 cases on the basis of unsup-
ported allegations of pricing, bounties or grants, or conspiracies and thus subject
importers to substantial expense and harassment which may unfairly damage their
competitive position. We believe it should be the policy of the Commission either
to defer to primary agencies or forums for resolution of issues where they believe
this possibility may exist, or, at the very least, make extensive use of procedural
devices such as dismissal, summary judgment and early offers to proof, quickly
to establish substantiality of a complainant's broad allegations.
Letter of Sept. 24, 1976, from Jonathon C. Rose, Deputy Assistant Attorney General.
264. "The Commission shall investigate any alleged violation of this section on com-
plaint under oath or upon its initiative." 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b) (1) (emphasis supplied).
265. Commonwealth Oil Refining v. United States, supra note 255.
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[I]t is the intent of the Committee that investigation be
commenced by the Commission as soon as possible after re-
ceipt of a properly filed petition.266
Further difficulties would arise at the time Treasury had com-
pleted its investigation and forwarded its findings to the Commis-
sion for its injury determination, since the Commission would then
have two separate although related investigations. 267
It does not appear that the Commission would wish to exer-
cise jurisdiction over a purely countervailing duty matter. For
example, in Color TV Sets, the Commission stated:
[W]e are not convinced that an adjudication under sec-
tion 337 of the receipt of economic benefits and incentives
from the Government of Japan in furtherance of an unlaw-
ful attempt or conspiracy to restrain or monopolize trade and
commerce in the United States necessarily involves a deter-
mination of whether the benefits or incentives are unlawful
per se - a matter which may be within the purview of sec-
tion 303 .268
Later in that same opinion the Commission says:
Accordingly, the Commission is not persuaded at this time
that the adjudication under section 337 of the alleged use
of economic benefits and incentives received from the Govern-
ment of Japan in furtherance of a scheme to restrain or
monopolize commerce in the United States necessarily in-
volves an adjudication of whether the benefits and incentives
are unlawful per se, a matter which may be within the pur-
view of section 303.89
Despite the portions of the Commission's Color TV Set
opinion to the effect that its adjudication in that case would not
266. FINANCE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 18, at 194.
267. And only one under he APA. This problem is presently facing the Commission
in Swimming Pools. In the section 337 investigation, the Presiding Officer issued his
R.D. on February 10, 1977 and the Commission is now considering the matter (includ-
ing predatory pricing). On April 1, 1977 (42 Fed. Reg. 17558) Treasury announced
its determination of sales at LTFV and referred the matter to the Commission for
its injury determination. Should the Commission be able to issue its decision and
opinion in the section 337 investigation shortly and prior to initiating action on the
dumping injury investigation, it will have avoided the problem in this case.
268. Color TV Sets, supra note 9, at 5-6.
269. Id. at 7.
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involve a per se determination of whether certain foreign govern-
ment benefits were unlawful under U.S. law (stating that this
was "a matter which may be within the purview of section 303"),
the question remains open as to whether the Commission would
consider such a per se determination under its section 337 juris-
diction.
The Commission has said:
Respondents in this investigation contend that an adju-
dication by the Commission of the complainants' allegations
requires an adjudication of issues of dumping and bounties
and grants, matters within the purview of the Antidumping
Act, 1921, and section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930, both of
which are administered in part by the Department of the
Treasury. They further contend that Congress did not give
the Commission jurisdiction under section 337 to adjudicate
matters which may be within the purview of these acts. The
Commission cannot agree with either of these contentions.T
The Commission does not appear to concede that the issue
in that case either dealt with dumping and bounties and grants
270. Id. at 4. In Color TV Sets, supra note 9, the Treasury Department stated its
view that the Commission may take the receipt of economic benefits by Respondents
and predatory pricing allegations into consideration, but only by accepting the find-
ings of Treasury.
This is not to say that, in view of the Treasury Department, the Commis-
sion, in pursuing an investigation under section 337, is foreclosed from taking into
account any dumping or subsidy practices that may have existed as it examines a
broad variety of trade activities in an effort to determine whether there has been
a violation of section 337. Rather, it is our view that insofar as dumping or
bounty or grant allegations are made in the context of an investigation under
section 337, the Commission cannot investigate such allegations independently or
look behind any conclusions reached by the Treasury Department, but must refer
such allegations to Treasury if the Department has not previously investigated
them and must accept the conclusions of the Department on such allegations
whenever they have been investigated.
Accordingly, I hope that the Commission, taking these views and those ex-
pressed by others into account, will limit its present investigation to substantive
matters over which it, and not the Treasury Department, has jurisdiction. To
the extent that matters in the antidumping and countervailing duty area are
relevant to the Commission in its investigation, I trust that the Commission will
either accept the conclusions of the Treasury Department where investigations
have been conducted, or refer to us unresolved questions.
Id., letter of September 24, 1976, from William E. Simons, Secretary of the Treasury.
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or that the Commission could not adjudicate such matters. The
reasoning of this opinion suggests that the Commission believed
that more than dumping or bounties and grants was involved.
And as to the quoted second contention of Respondents:
As to respondents' second contention, that Congress did
not give the Commission jurisdiction under section 337 to
adjudicate matters that may be within the purview of the
Antidumping Act or section 303, the Commission is of a
different view. 2 71
The Commission explains:
[S]ection 337 is an authority of concurrent jurisdic-
tion with all other statutes applicable to unfair practices in
import trade.212
It would appear that when the Commission has occasion to deter-
mine whether government bounties or grants are such unfair
practices it could well find they are not. However, this would not
be the case in typical dumping matters.
The Commission noted legislative history referring to the
Commission's practice of not investigating matters clearly under
the countervailing duty or Antidumping Act stating:
This expression of Congressional intent suggests that
the Commission should, in a manner consistent with law,
avoid imposing the burden of simultaneous and possibly
duplicative investigations of matters that are "clearly" within
the purview of section 303 or the Antidumping Act.273
The Commission explains its view of this language as meaning,
"This legislative history, however, is not a substantive limitation
on the Commission's jurisdiction under section 337, as amended.2 4
The Commission then defines its "practice," as mentioned by
the Senate Finance Committee, as referring to "correspondence
and other inquiries alleging the suspected existence of dumping
or export subsidization" being "routinely routed to Treasury, as
they are today."215 Unfortunately, no specific examples of the
271. Id. at 8.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 11.
274. Id.
275. Id.
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practice referred to were set forth either by the Senate Finance
Committee or the Commission. The earlier section herein on sec-
tion 337 history in conjunction with the Senate Finance Com-
mittee statement would indicate that the Commission should not
investigate such matters. This does not mean it should neces-
sarily refuse jurisdiction, but only that to "avoid imposing the
burden of simultaneous and possibly duplicative investigations
of matters that are 'clearly' within the purview of Section 303
or the Antidumping Act" the Commission should suspend action
on at least those portions of its investigation pending completion
of Treasury's investigations.
This statement by the Commission appears to admit the
possibility of the Commission's refusing jurisdiction until Treas-
ury has completed its handling of the matter. The theory would
be, as stated in the Commission's Color T.V. Set Memorandum
Opinion, that if action by Treasury has eliminated the unfair act,
then there would be no need for the Commission to exercise sec-
tion 337 jurisdiction.
Does the imposition of dumping duties eliminate the unfair
act or does it merely lessen the effect of the unfair act on competi-
tion? Since, in a dumping matter, it is the injury and not the
intent which is determinative, the Treasury's remedy may well be
unsuitable to protect competition, yet adequate under the Anti-
dumping Act. Since predatory pricing is a violation of the unfair
competition or antitrust laws (violation of section 3 of the
Robinson-Patman Act or section 1 of the Sherman Act) which
includes as an element the intent to injure competition, will
Treasury's remedy prevent the continued violation of section 337?
This can be distilled into the threshold question of whether it is
the price to the customer in the United States or the price
charged by the alleged violator which need be examined. The
price charged by the alleged violator presumably remains the
same; however, since Treasury will have to impose dumping
duties, the price to customers will no longer be at predatory levels.
We believe that in the situation presented, where the section 337
complaint alleges no more than that which Treasury examines in
an antidumping investigation, the imposition of dumping duties
may well eliminate any violation under section 337.
This solution would appear to be satisfactory only when
limited solely to matters clearly within the purview of the Anti-
dumping Act. If matters not clearly within the Antidumping Act
are alleged, it does not appear to be a satisfactory solution for
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the Commission to refuse to take jurisdiction pending completion
by Treasury of its investigation.
Treasury's completion of investigation is meant to be that
point when Treasury has finally disposed of the dumping prob-
lem. This means that Treasury has made its dumping finding,
has referred the matter to the Commission, that the Commission
has found injury caused by the dumping, and that Treasury has
actually assessed dumping duties.
For dumping purposes a finding of dumping plus injury is
sufficient, and intent does not play a part in the violation. To
establish a predatory pricing violation, on the other hand, intent
is of the essence of the violation. It may occur that the Commis-
sion would find in its dumping investigation that there is no
injury, while based on a section 337 complaint on the same mat-
ter, it may find an intent to injure competition. In these circum-
stances, it would appear that dumping duties could not be as-
sessed, but the Commission could find a section 337 violation.
In this event, it would not serve the public interest for the Com-
mission to withhold taking any action in a section 337 proceeding
while Treasury is conducting its antidumping investigation.
The problem becomes even more difficult when the Commis-
sion is considering the likelihood of injury to the domestic industry
under the Antidumping Act. This is true since a determination
of "likelihood" requires an examination of "intent" to a certain
extent. However, the "intent" examined under the Antidumping
Act is an intent to continue the price variance, whereas the intent
necessary under section 337 (established antitrust law) is an
intent to injure competition. Indeed, there may be instances
where an article is being sold in the domestic market and the
foreign market for the same price, which is below the cost of
production. In these circumstances, there would be no actual
price differential,2T6 and the wrongfulness of the situation would
rest on the unlawful intent to injure competition. Likewise, there
may be instances where there are substantial price differentials
and there is injury to the domestic industry (or likelihood of
injury to the domestic industry) notwithstanding the fact that
there is no intent to injure competition.
Therefore, withholding the Commission's exercise of juris-
diction pending the dumping finding would appear to be possible
276.. According to section 204(d) of-the Trade Act of 1974 amending 19 U.S.C.
§ 164, this situation might be handled in an antidumping proceeding at Treasury.
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and sometimes desirable in purely dumping matters. However, if
predatory pricing (intent to injure a competitor) is an issue in
a section 337 proceeding, the Commission should consider pro-
ceeding immediately with its investigation into that matter. The
Commission appears to recognize this as a workable solution when
it states:
The Commission may, pursuant to section 337(b) (1), sus-
pend its section 337 investigation pending the outcome of
any proceedings under those statutes. At the completion of
any such proceedings, the Commission may consider the evi-
dence obtained and, where appropriate, take official notice
of the findings, in continuing with its section 337 investiga-
tion as the facts warrant. If the only matters alleged in the
section 337 investigation fall "clearly within the purview" of
the Antidumping Act or section 303, then action taken under
either of those statutes may dispose of the alleged unfair
trade practices and the resultant injury.
3. The Commission can take jurisdiction immediately.
There are two options to this solution, inasmuch as the Com-
mission can take jurisdiction without limitation or may take
jurisdiction with certain limitations on its investigation.
At the conclusion of the consideration of the preceding alter-
native, a situation was hypothesized which would appear to re-
quire the Commission to take jurisdiction under section 337 and
restrict its inquiry to matters which are not clearly within the
purview of the Antidumping Act. For the reasons already set
forth in the preceding section, this would appear to involve solely
the findings of the investigation by Treasury as to whether or
not there is dumping and, if so, the margins thereof. While
Treasury is conducting its investigation, the Commission may
proceed to investigate predatory pricing, particularly the element
of intent.
If this is done, it will mean simultaneous proceedings by
Treasury and the Commission, although directed to different
277. Color TV Sets, supra note 9, at 12. The Commission, however, must
exercise great caution in considering evidence from other proceedings or in taking
official notice of them, with a view to ensuring compliance with the APA. Also, in
antitrust type cases there may be no "resultant injury" in a section 337 context, to
have been disposed of.
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aspects of the problem. Assuming that Treasury finds dumping,
it would then refer the matter to the Commission for a deter-
mination as to whether or not there is injury caused by the dump-
ing. At this stage, the Commission would find itself handling a
section 337 investigation and a dumping investigation at the same
time concerning similar fact situations. In the past, when faced
with a similar situation (a section 337 investigation and an in-
dustry investigation under section 201), the Commission sus-
pended its section 337 proceeding until it completed the industry
investigation and had sent its report to the President. At that
time it resumed its section 337 proceeding. This occurred in
Color TV Sets. 27' The statutory time limit of one year was tolled
278. In Color TV Sets, supra note 9, the Department of State suggested the Com-
mission take jurisdiction but limit its investigation pending the results of the Treasury
Department as to matter within the purview of the antidumping and countervailing
duty laws.
It is our view that practices which fall within the purview of the anti-
dumping or countervailing duty laws can also be elements of broader practices
with respect to which the Commission is empowered to grant relief under section
337 of the Tariff Act of 1930. At the same time we strongly believe, based on
both policy and legal grounds, that the Commission must refer these specific
elements to the Department of the Treasury for purposes of investigation. The
Commission can then determine whether relief is appropriate under section 337,
based on new investigations or rulings by Treasury and any investigation by the
Commission of other alleged practices.
A decision to proceed with the investigation in this case would represent an
especially embarrassing example of abuse of governmental processes. In two
diplomatic notes to the Department of State, the Government of Japan has pointed
out that the investigation, because it embraces issues which have already been
the subject of separate antidumping and countervailing duty investigations and
of current antitrust litigation, places an unjustifiable and serious burden on
the respondent companies.
The Commission should therefore, decide whether the complaints before it
sufficiently state a claim which goes beyond the purview of the antidumping and
countervailing duty laws. If they do not it should refer the complaints to the
Treasury and terminate its investigation of them. If they do, it should still refer
charges which fall under these laws to the Treasury and should investigate the
remaining allegations. Based on its findings and those of Treasury, it can grant
or deny relief under section 337, as appropriate.
Id., letter of September 24, 1976, from the Department of State. This view is reen-
forced by that of the Special Representative For Trade Negotiations:
The Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations strongly
urges that the Commission's investigation be confined to allegations of practices
that are clearly beyond the scope of the Antidumping Act, 1921, and the counter-
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during the time the section 337 investigation was under the self-
imposed suspension.
As the Commission points out, section 337 (b) (3) seems to
be worded to parallel section 201 (b) (6), which states:
In the course of any proceeding under this subsection,
the Commission shall investigate any factors which in its judg-
ment may be contributing to increased imports of the arti-
cle under investigation; and whenever in the course of its
investigation the Commission has reason to believe that the
increased imports are attributable in part to circumstances
which come within the purview of the Antidumping Act,
1921, section 303 or 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, or other
remedial provision of law, the Commission shall promptly
notify the appropriate agency so that such action may be
taken as is otherwise authorized by such provisions of
law.279
vailing duty law (Section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended). We urge
that the Commission take this position both on grounds of law and policy.
Insofar as the complaint rests on allegations of dumping within the purview
of the Antidumping Act, we believe that the Commission should rely upon the
findings which have been made by the Department of the Treasury in this matter.
Similarly, insofar as subsidization is alleged within the scope of the countervailing
duty law, we would submit that the Commission should rely for this aspect of
the investigation on the findings of the Treasury Department. If further unre-
solved questions are deemed to exist under these statutes, they should be referred
to the Treasury Department for further consideration. It would be for the
Commission to determine whether the investigation of conspiracy, monopoly, or
other unfair trade practices should continue independently prior to a further
determination being made by the Secretary of the Treasury, if any is required.
I do not presume to advise the Commission as to whether the separation of
the dumping and subsidization allegations from the section 337 complaint would
require the Commission to abandon this investigation, as maintained by the Presid-
ing Officer in this investigation. This office is confining its comments to recom-
mending in the strongest terms that the Commission limit its present investigation
to matters not falling within the scope of the Antidumping Act and the counter-
vailing duty law. If the Commission determines, however, that matters falling
within those two statutes constitute necessary elements in a broader investigation
of unfair practices, I urge that it rely upon the determination of the Secretary
of the Treasury to establish those particular unfair trade practices, rather than
conduct a separate independent investigation on these matters.
Id., letter of September 24, 1976.
279. Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 201(b) (6), 88 Stat. 2013.
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This latter section has been explained to mean:
[T]he Tariff Commission will be required whenever in the
course of its investigation it has reason to believe that the
increased imports are attributable in part to circumstances
which come within the purview of the Antidumping Act,
countervailing duty statutes (Section 303 of the Tariff Act
of 1930), or the unfair import practices statutes (Section 337
of the Tariff Act of 1930) or other remedial provisions of
law, promptly to notify the appropriate agency so that such
action may be taken as is otherwise authorized by such pro-
visions of law. Action under one of those provisions when
possible is to be preferred over action under this chapter.
This provision is designed to assure that the United
States will not needlessly invoke the escape-clause (article
XIX of the GATT) and will not become involved in grant-
ing compensatory concessions or inviting retaliation in situa-
tions where the appropriate remedy may be action under
one or more United States laws against unfair competition
for which action no compensation or retaliation is in order.2 80
Later in its report the Way and Means Committee again explains
that in the course of a section 201 investigation the Commission
is promptly to notify the appropriate agency if the Commission
"has reason to believe that the increased imports are attributable
in part to circumstances which come within the purview of the
Antidumping Act, 1921, section 303, or 337 of the Tariff Act of
1930, or other remedial provisions of law.., so that such action
may be taken as is otherwise authorized by such provisions oflaw.,,P281
One difficulty facing the Commission in attempting to comply
with this legislative intent is that the statute appears to prevent
it from so doing. Section 201 (d) (2) provides:
The report of the Commission of its determination under
subsection (b) shall be made at the earliest practicable time,
but not later than 6 months after the date on which the
petition is filed.. 282
280. WAYS AND MEANS REPORT, supra note 118, at 47. The SENATE FINANCE
CoMMirrFE REPORT, supra note 18, contains virtually the same language at 122-23.
281. Id. at 112.
282. Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 201 (d) (2), 88 Stat. 2013.
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The Commission's conclusion is:
Just as the Commission does not construe section 201 (b)
(6) as a limitation on the jurisdiction of the Commission
under section 201, it does not view section 337 (b) (3) as a
limitation on the broad jurisdiction of the Commission under
section 337.283
In examining the possibilities and technicalities involved
with this alternative, it appears that the Commission has already
set sail on the course we have outlined above. In Welded Steel
Tubes2 4 it was questioned whether the complaint had sufficient
allegations for a section 337 investigation to be properly initiated,
and whether the matter possibly should be handled by Treasury
as a dumping matter. The Commission took the unique step of
conducting a public hearing prior to making its determination as
to whether or not an investigation should be instituted. At the
hearing, the complainant and respondents agreed that a dumping
matter was not presented. Rather, the arguments related to
whether an antitrust conspiracy had been alleged. The respond-
ents and the Department of Justice2 5 took the position that a
conspiracy had not been properly alleged and that an investigation
should not be instituted. However, the Commission proceeded to
institute an investigation.28 6
It appears that the Commission should require specific de-
tailed factual pleadings when predatory pricing allegations are
283. Color TV Sets, supra note 9, at 11.
284. Welded Steel Tubes, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-29. Complaint filed Novem-
ber 15, 1976.
285. Id. Transcript of hearing of January 26, 1977.
286. Id. Notice of Investigation, 42 Fed. Reg. 10348. The Commission after insti-
tuting a section 337 investigation on February 22, 1977, notified Treasury on March 2,
1977, that the section 337 complaint filed in Stainless Steel Tubing, may involve matters
coming within the purview of the Antidumping Act, 1921. Previously, in 1972,
Treasury, in an antidumping investigation concerning the same products, had deter-
mined that in view of formal assurances "from the manufacturers that they would
make no future sales at less than fair value" and that this constituted "evidence war-
ranting the discontinuance of the investigation" (37 Fed. Reg. 15742, August 4, 1972),
the investigation was discontinued (37 Fed. Reg. 24838, November 22, 1972). Based on
the information received from the Commission, the investigation was reopened by
Treasury (42 Fed. Reg. 16883, March 30, 1977). That same day respondents at the
Commission filed a motion to terminate and dismiss and in the alternative to suspend
the pending section 337 investigation. (Motion filed March 30, 1977, Motions 29-37
and 29-40. As this article goes to press the matter is being briefed before the
Presiding Officer.)
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made. This is necessary so that the Commission may determine
whether it can, in a particular case, distinguish predatory pricing
allegations from dumping allegations. If it can so distinguish,
then the bounds of its inquiry will be clearly defined in relation to
a concurrent investigation being conducted by Treasury. If a clear
distinction cannot be established, the Commission should consider
suspending its investigation pending the outcome of proceedings
at Treasury.
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APPENDIX
SEC. 337. UNFAIR PRACTICES IN IMPORT TRADE.
(a) UNFAIR METHODS OF COMPETITION DECLARED UNLAW-
FUL. - Unfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the importation of articles
into the United States, or in their sale by the owner, importer, consignee, or agent
of either, the effect or tendency of which is to destroy or substantially injure an
industry, efficiently and economically operated, in the United States, or to prevent
the establishment of such an industry, or to restrain or monopolize trade and com-
merce in the United States, are declared unlawful, and when found by the Commission
to exist shall be dealt with, in addition to any other provisions of law, as provided
in this section.
(b) INVESTIGATIONS OF VIOLATIONS BY COMMISSION; TIME
LIMITS. - (1) The Commission shall investigate any alleged violation of this
section on complaint under oath or upon its initiative. Upon commencing any such
investigation, the Commission shall publish notice thereof in the Federal Register.
The Commission shall conclude any such investigation, and make its determination
under this section, at the earliest practicable time, but not later than one year (18
months in more complicated cases) after that date of publication of notice of such in-
vestigation. The Commission shall publish in the Federal Register its reasons for
designating any investigation as a more complicated investigation. For purposes of
the one-year and 18-month periods prescribed by this subsection, there shall be ex-
cluded any period of time during which such investigation is suspended because of
proceedings in a court or agency of the United States involving similar questions
concerning the subject matter of such investigation.
(2) During the course of each investigation under this section, the Com-
mission shall consult with and seek advice and information from, the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare, the Department of Justice, the Federal Trade Com-
mission, and such other departments and agencies as it considers appropriate.
(3) Whenever, in the course of an investigation under this section, the
Commission has reason to believe, based on information before it, that the matter
may come within the purview of section 303 or of the Antidumping Act, 1921, it shall
promptly notify the Secretary of the Treasury so that such action may be taken as
is otherwise authorized by such section and such Act.
(c) DETERMINATIONS; REVIEW. - The Commission shall deter-
mine, with respect to each investigation conducted by it under this section, whether
or not there is a violation of this section. Each determination under subsection (d)
or (e) shall be made on the record after notice and opportunity for a hearing in con-
fortity with the provisions of subchapter II of chapter 5 of title 5, United States
Code. All legal and equitable defenses may be presented in all cases. Any person
adversely affected by a final determination of the Commission under subsection (d)
or (e) may appeal such determination to the United States Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals. Such court shall have jurisdiction to review such determination in
the same manner and subject to the same limitations and conditions as in the case of
appeals from decisions of the United States Customs Court.
(d) EXCLUSION OF ARTICLES FROM ENTRY. - If the Commis-
sion determines, as a result of an investigation under this section, that there is viola-
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tion of this section, it shall direct that the articles concerned, imported by any person
violating the provision of this section, be excluded from entry into the United States,
unless, afer considering the effect of such exclusion upon the public health and wel-
fare, competitive conditions in the United States economy, the production of like or
directly competitive articles in the United States, and United States consumers, it
finds that such articles should not be excluded from entry. The Commission shall
notify the Secretary of the Treasury of its action under this subsection directing
such exclusion from entry, and upon receipt of such notice, the Secretary shall, through
the proper officers, refuse such entry.
(e) EXCLUSION OF ARTICLES FROM ENTRY DURING INVESTI-
GATION EXCEPT UNDER BOND. - If, during the course of an investigation
under this section, the Commission determines that there is reason to believe that
there is a violation of this section, it may direct that the articles concerned, imported
by any person with respect to whom there is reason to believe that such person is
violating this section, be excluded from entry into the United States, unless, after
considering the effect of such exclusion upon the public health and welfare, competitive
conditions in the United States economy, the production of like or directly competitive
articles in the United States, and United States consumers, it finds that such articles
should not be excluded from entry. The Commission shall notify the Secretary of the
Treasury of its action under this subsection directing such exclusion from entry, and
upon receipt of such notice, the Secretary shall, through the proper officers, refuse
such entry, except that such articles shall be entitled to entry under bond determined
by the Commission and prescribed by the Secretary.
(f) CEASE AND DESIST ORDERS. - In lieu of taking action under
subsection (d) or (e), the Commission may issue and cause to be served on any
person violating this section, or believed to be violating this section, as the case may
be, an order directing such person to cease and desist from engaging in the unfair
methods or acts involved, unless after considering the effect of such order upon the
public health and welfare, competitive conditions in the United States economy, the
production of like or directly competitive articles in the United States, and United
States consumers, it finds that such order should not be issued. The Commission
may at any time, upon such notice and in such manner as it deems proper, modify
or revoke any such order, and, in the case of a revocation, may take action under
subsection (d) or (e), as the case may be.
(g) REFERRAL TO THE PRESIDENT. - (1) If the Commission
determines that there is a violation of this section, or that, for purposes of subsection
(e), there is reason to believe that there is such a violation, it shall-
(A) publish such determination in the Federal Register, and
(B) transmit to the President a copy of such determination and the action
taken under subsection (d), (e), or (f), with respect thereto, together with the record
upon which such determination is based.
(2) If, before the close of the 60-day period beginning on the day after the
day on which he receives a copy of such determination, the President, for policy rea-
sons, disapproves such determination and notifies the Commission of his disapproval,
then, effective on the date of such notice, such determination and the action taken under
subsection (d), (e), or (f) with respect thereto shall have no force or effect.
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(3) Subject to the provisions of paragraph (2), such determination shall,
except for purposes of subsection (c), be effective upon publication thereof in the
Federal Register, and the action taken under subsection (d), (e), or (f) with respect
thereto shall be effective as provided in such subsections, except that articles directed
to be excluded from entry under subsection (d) or subject to a cease and desist order
under subsection (f) shall be entitled to entry under bond determined by the Com-
mission and prescribed by the Secretary until such determination becomes final.
(4) If the President does not disapprove such determination within such
60-day period, or if he notifies the Commission before the close of such period that
he approves such determination, then, for purposes of paragraph (3) and subsection
(c) such determination shall become final on the day after the close of such period
or the day on which the President notifies the Commission of his approval, as
the case may be.
(h) PERIOD OF EFFECTIVENESS. - Except as provided in sub-
sections (f) and (g), any exclusion from entry or order under this section shall
continue in effect until the Commission finds, and in the case of exclusion from entry
notifies the Secretary of the Treasury, that the condition which led to such exclusion
from entry or order no longer exist.
(i) IMPORTATIONS BY OR FOR THE UNITED STATES. - Any
exclusion from entry or order under subsection (d), (e), or (f), in cases based on
claims of United States letters patent, shall not apply to any articles imported by
and for the use of the United States, or imported for, and to be used for, the United
States with the authorization or consent of the Government. Whenever any article
would have been excluded from entry or would not have been entered pursuant to
the provisions of such subsections but for the operation of this subsection, a patent
owner adversely affected shall be entitled to reasonable and entire compensation in an
action before the Court of Claims pursuant to the procedures of section 1498 of title
28, United States Code.
(j) DEFINITION OF UNITED STATES. - For purposes of this sec-
tion and sections 338 and 340, the term 'United States' means the customs territory
of the United States as defined in general headnote 2 of the Tariff Schedules of the
United States. (Public Law 93-618, 93rd Congress, H.R. 10710, January 3, 1975.)
